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La dynamique de changement des formes de gouvernance : le cas français (2000-2014)

Author

Listed:
  • Xavier Hollandts

    (CRCGM et IFGE - Kedge Business School - Kedge BS - Kedge Business School)

  • Daniela Borodak

    (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UdA - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ariane Tichit

    (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UdA - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

(VF)Cet article se donne pour objectif d’examiner une dimension cruciale et pourtant méconnue de la gouvernance des entreprises. Nous étudions la dynamique de la gouvernance des sociétés cotées françaises (SBF 120) sur une longue période d’observation (2000-2014) qui englobe les principales réformes françaises. Plus précisément, nous analysons les variables susceptibles d’influencer la stabilité de la structure de gouvernance. Pour cela, nous mobilisons des modèles de durée multi-états de type semi-markovien afin d’analyser à la fois la durée et les transitions d’une forme de gouvernance à une autre des sociétés cotées françaises. Nos résultats montrent que la stabilité de la structure de gouvernance est essentiellement liée aux caractéristiques personnelles du dirigeant en poste, à la performance de l’entreprise et la structure actionnariale. Cependant, un examen approfondi par type de transition montre l’influence multiple et parfois contrastée de certaines variables. (VA) The aim of this article is to examine a crucial and yet unknown aspect of corporate governance. More precisely, we analyze the variables which are likely to influence the stability of the governance structure of French listed companies (SBF 120 index). We study the dynamics of corporate governance over a long period of observation (2000-2014), which encompasses the main French reforms. We use duration models based on Markovian-type processes to examine both the transitions from one form of governance to the other, but also the duration and therefore the stability of the forms of governance of listed French companies. Our results show that the stability of the corporate governance structure is linked to the personal characteristics of the CEO, the performance of the company and the shareholder structure essentially. However, a thorough examination by type of transition shows the multiple and sometimes contrasted influence of some variables. Our article brings a new light on the dynamics of the go
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Hollandts & Daniela Borodak & Ariane Tichit, 2018. "La dynamique de changement des formes de gouvernance : le cas français (2000-2014)," Post-Print hal-02022915, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02022915
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02022915
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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