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'Large' vs. 'Small' Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks

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  • Geir H. Bjønnes
  • Steinar Holden
  • Dagfinn Rime
  • Haakon O. Aa. Solheim

Abstract

What is the role of “large players” like hedge funds and other highly leveraged institutions in speculative attacks? In recent theoretical work, large players may induce an attack by an early move, providing information to smaller agents. In contrast, many observers argue that large players are in the rear. We propose a model that allows both the large player to move early in order to induce speculation by small players, or wait so as to benefit from a high interest rate prior to the attack. Using data on net positions of “large” (foreigners) and “small” (locals) players, we find that large players moved last in three attacks on the Norwegian krone (nok) during the 1990s: The ERM-crisis of 1992, the NOK-pressure in 1997, and after the Russian moratorium in 1998. In 1998 there was a contemporaneous attack on the Swedish krona (sek) in which large players moved early. Interest rates did not increase in Sweden so there was little to gain by a delayed attack.

Suggested Citation

  • Geir H. Bjønnes & Steinar Holden & Dagfinn Rime & Haakon O. Aa. Solheim, 2009. "'Large' vs. 'Small' Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks," CESifo Working Paper Series 2518, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2518
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    Cited by:

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    2. Bjönnes, Geir H. & Holden, Steinar & Rime, Dagfinn & Solheim, Haakon O.Aa., 2005. "'Large' vs. 'Small' Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks," SIFR Research Report Series 38, Institute for Financial Research.
    3. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 195-234, February.
    4. Li, Mei & Milne, Frank, 2014. "The role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 590-620.
    5. Akram, Q. Farooq & Rime, Dagfinn & Sarno, Lucio, 2008. "Arbitrage in the foreign exchange market: Turning on the microscope," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 237-253, December.
    6. Ulf Axelson & Sandeep Baliga, 2009. "Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(10), pages 3907-3939, October.
    7. Rydqvist, Kristian, 2010. "Tax Arbitrage with Risk and Effort Aversion - Swedish Lottery Bonds 1970-1990," SIFR Research Report Series 70, Institute for Financial Research.
    8. Fedyk, Yuriy & Walden, Johan, 2007. "High-Speed Natural Selection in Financial Markets with Large State Spaces," SIFR Research Report Series 52, Institute for Financial Research.
    9. Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Garcia, Justin R. & Wernerfelt, Nils & Lum, J. Koji & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2010. "Dopamine and Risk Preferences in Different Domains," Working Paper Series rwp10-012, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    speculative attacks; microstructure; international finance; large players;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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