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The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society

Author

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  • Manfred J. Holler
  • Bengt-Arne Wickström

Abstract

Social conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. It is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes with changes in the population structure due to generation shifts. A scandal is defined as a breach of the accepted norm by a prominent person When the critical mass necessary for a change in the accepted convention is sufficiently small, a scandal can trigger such a change since the scandal maker has a certain number of sympathizers, who follow her in breaking the accepted norm. The argument is illustrated with several examples from the history of mankind.

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred J. Holler & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 1998. "The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," CESifo Working Paper Series 159, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_159
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/ces_wp159.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1999. "Inflation and Welfare: Comment on Robert Lucas," NBER Working Papers 6979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • J19 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Other
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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