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Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples

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  • Brams, Steven J.
  • Mattli, Walter

Abstract

“We discussed what the Soviet reaction would be to any possible move by the United States, what our reaction with them would have to be to that Soviet reaction, and so on, trying to follow each of those roads to their ultimate conclusion.†Theodore C. Sorensen about the deliberations of the Executive Committee during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis (Holsti, Brody, and North, 1964: 188). “What are you going to do after that? Look ahead, look ahead-two or three or four steps ahead.†Mikhail S. Gorbachev to emissaries of the junta that staged the August 1991 attempted coup in the Soviet Union (Clines, 1991).
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Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J. & Mattli, Walter, 1992. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Working Papers 92-52, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:92-52
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    2. Greenberg,Joseph, 1991. "The Theory of Social Situations," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521376891, September.
    3. Jack Hirshleifer, 1985. "Protocol, Payoff, and Equilibrium: Game Theory and Social Modelling," UCLA Economics Working Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Steven J. Brams & Ben D. Mor, 1993. "When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(4), pages 432-454, October.
    5. T. Marschak & R. Selten, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93.
    6. Greenberg,Joseph, 1991. "The Theory of Social Situations," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521374255, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marek Hudik, 2020. "Equilibrium as compatibility of plans," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 349-368, October.
    2. Ben D. Mor & Zeev Maoz, 1999. "Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries: a Strategic Approach," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 1-48, February.
    3. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
    4. Manfred J. Holler & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 1998. "The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," CESifo Working Paper Series 159, CESifo.
    5. Haiyan Xu & D. Marc Kilgour & Keith W. Hipel, 2011. "Matrix Representation of Conflict Resolution in Multiple-Decision-Maker Graph Models with Preference Uncertainty," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 20(6), pages 755-779, November.
    6. Marek Hudik, 0. "Equilibrium as compatibility of plans," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-20.
    7. Lester A. Zeager, "undated". "A Model of Strategic Behavior in Three Cuban Refugee Crises," Working Papers 0202, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.
    8. Lester A. Zeager, "undated". "Negotiations for Refugee Repatriation or Local Settlement: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 9730, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.
    9. Ben D. Mor, 1995. "Crisis Initiation and Misperception," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 351-367, July.
    10. John H.P. Williams & Lester A. Zeager, 2004. "Macedonian Border Closings in the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(4), pages 233-254, September.
    11. Lester A. Zeager & Johnathan B. Bascom, 1996. "Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 460-485, September.

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