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Fighting Pollution When Decisions Are Strategic

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  • Holler, Manfred J

Abstract

In this paper, the author analyzes antipollution policies in a 2-by-2 game played between a 'polluter' and the 'police' in which the payoffs can be manipulated by an exogenous third player called the 'policymaker.' He shows that the efficiency of the policies may depend on whether the players of the 2-by-2 game choose Nash equilibrium strategies or prefer maximin. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Holler, Manfred J, 1993. "Fighting Pollution When Decisions Are Strategic," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 347-356, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:76:y:1993:i:4:p:347-56
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    Cited by:

    1. Tim Friehe, 2008. "Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: some theory and an application to corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 127-143, October.
    2. Keisaku Higashida, 2019. "Burden of Inspection Costs and Effectiveness of Environmental Regulations," Discussion Paper Series 189, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    3. Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Tempting righteous citizens? Counterintuitive effects of increasing sanctions in the realm of organized crime," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 37-40.
    4. Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
    5. A. Antoci & S. Borghesi & G. Iannucci, 2016. "Green licenses and environmental corruption: a random matching model," Working Paper CRENoS 201615, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    6. Alfred Endres & Andreas Lüdeke, 1998. "Limited Liability and Imperfect Information—On the Existence of Safety Equilibria Under Products Liability Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 153-165, March.
    7. Berno Buechel & Eike Emrich & Stefanie Pohlkamp, 2016. "Nobody’s Innocent," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(8), pages 767-789, December.
    8. Manfred J. Holler & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 1998. "The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," CESifo Working Paper Series 159, CESifo.
    9. Angelo Antoci & Simone Borghesi & Gianluca Iannucci, 2021. "(Dis)honest bureaucrats and (non)compliant firms in an evolutionary game," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 321-344, May.
    10. Daniel G. Arce, 2018. "On the cooperative and competitive aspects of strategic monitoring," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(3), pages 377-390, August.
    11. Perry, Logan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2019. "Foresight in a Game of Leadership," SocArXiv 84yxz, Center for Open Science.
    12. Buechel, Berno & Emrich, Eike & Pohlkamp, Stefanie, 2013. "Nobody's innocent: the role of customers in the doping dilemma," MPRA Paper 44627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Gianfranco Gambarelli & Daniele Gervasio & Francesca Maggioni & Daniel Faccini, 2022. "A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 295-307, June.
    14. Manfred J. Holler & Barbara Klose-Ullmann, 2008. "Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(3), pages 197-218, December.
    15. Manfred J. Holler & Martin A. Leroch, 2014. "Theories of justice and empirical results," Chapters, in: Francesco Forte & Ram Mudambi & Pietro Maria Navarra (ed.), A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 6, pages 143-159, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Josef Montag, 2013. "A radical change in traffic law: effects on fatalities in the Czech Republic," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2013-39, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    17. Péter Cserne, "undated". "The Normativity of Law in Law and Economics," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1113, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    18. Arce, Daniel G., 2010. "Corporate virtue: Treatment of whistle blowers and the punishment of violators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 363-371, September.
    19. Giovanni Villani & Marta Biancardi, 2023. "An Evolutionary Game to Study Banks–Firms Relationship: Monitoring Intensity and Private Benefit," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 1075-1093, March.
    20. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Penalty and Crime with Lumpy Choices," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 403-421, October.
    21. Gupta, Shreekant & Saksena, Shalini & Baris, Omer F., 2019. "Environmental enforcement and compliance in developing countries: Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 313-327.

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