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The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games : A second folk-theorem

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  • Holler, Manfred J.

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  • Holler, Manfred J., 1990. "The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games : A second folk-theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 319-323, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:32:y:1990:i:4:p:319-323
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    Cited by:

    1. de Palma, Andre & Leruth, Luc, 1996. "Variable willingness to pay for network externalities with strategic standardization decisions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 235-251, September.
    2. Alfred Endres & Andreas Lüdeke, 1998. "Limited Liability and Imperfect Information—On the Existence of Safety Equilibria Under Products Liability Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 153-165, March.
    3. Berno Buechel & Eike Emrich & Stefanie Pohlkamp, 2016. "Nobody’s Innocent," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(8), pages 767-789, December.
    4. Manfred J. Holler & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 1998. "The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," CESifo Working Paper Series 159, CESifo.
    5. Holler Manfred J., 2002. "Classical, Modern, and New Game Theory / Klassische, Moderne und Neue Spieltheorie," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 222(5), pages 556-583, October.
    6. Buechel, Berno & Emrich, Eike & Pohlkamp, Stefanie, 2013. "Nobody's innocent: the role of customers in the doping dilemma," MPRA Paper 44627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Manfred Holler, 1992. "Nash equilibrium reconsidered and an option for maximin," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 323-335, August.
    8. Manfred J. Holler & Barbara Klose-Ullmann, 2008. "Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(3), pages 197-218, December.
    9. Manfred J. Holler & Martin A. Leroch, 2014. "Theories of justice and empirical results," Chapters, in: Francesco Forte & Ram Mudambi & Pietro Maria Navarra (ed.), A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 6, pages 143-159, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Manfred Holler & Ines Lindner, 2004. "Mediation as Signal," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 165-173, March.
    11. Manfred Holler, 1993. "Nash equilibrium reconsidered and an option for maximin," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 103-115, February.

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