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Nobody’s Innocent

Author

Listed:
  • Berno Buechel
  • Eike Emrich
  • Stefanie Pohlkamp

Abstract

Customers who boycott an organization after some scandal may actually exacerbate the fraud problem they would like to prevent. This conclusion is derived from a game-theoretic model that introduces a third player into the standard inspection game. Focusing on the example of doping in professional sports, we observe that doping is prevalent in equilibrium because customers undermine an organizer’s incentives to inspect the athletes. Establishing transparency about doping tests is necessary but not sufficient to overcome this dilemma. Our analysis has practical implications for the design of anti-doping policies as well as for other situations of fraudulent activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Berno Buechel & Eike Emrich & Stefanie Pohlkamp, 2016. "Nobody’s Innocent," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(8), pages 767-789, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:17:y:2016:i:8:p:767-789
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002514551475
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey Cisyk & Pascal Courty, 2017. "Do Fans Care About Compliance to Doping Regulations in Sports? The Impact of PED Suspension in Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 18(4), pages 323-350, May.
    2. Richau Lukas & Emrich Eike & Follert Florian, 2019. "Quid Pro Quo! Organization Theoretical Remarks about FIFA’s Legitimacy Under Blatter and Infantino," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, December.
    3. Daniel Westmattelmann & Marius Sprenger & Sascha Hokamp & Gerhard Schewe, 2020. "Money matters: The impact of prize money on doping behaviour," Sport Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 688-703, October.
    4. Jeffrey Cisyk, 2020. "Impacts of Performance-Enhancing Drug Suspensions on the Demand for Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(4), pages 391-419, May.
    5. Andreas Goetsch & Christian Salzmann, 2018. "The Role of Ex Post Audits in Doping Enforcement," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 19(7), pages 960-976, October.
    6. David Hirschmann, 2017. "May Increasing Doping Sanctions Discourage Entry to the Competition?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 18(7), pages 720-736, October.
    7. Kasim Music, 2020. "The Undesirable Consequences of Doping Regulations: Why Stricter Efforts Might Strengthen Doping Incentives," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(3), pages 281-303, April.

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