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Nash equilibrium vs. maximin : A comparative game statics analysis

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  • Wittman, Donald

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  • Wittman, Donald, 1993. "Nash equilibrium vs. maximin : A comparative game statics analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 559-565, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:9:y:1993:i:4:p:559-565
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    Cited by:

    1. Kirstein, Roland, 2005. "Bayesian Monitoring," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    2. Alfred Endres & Andreas Lüdeke, 1998. "Limited Liability and Imperfect Information—On the Existence of Safety Equilibria Under Products Liability Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 153-165, March.
    3. Manfred J. Holler & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 1998. "The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," CESifo Working Paper Series 159, CESifo.
    4. Shidiqi, khalifany ash & Pradiptyo, rimawan, 2011. "A game theoretical analysis of economic sanction," MPRA Paper 30481, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    6. Daniel G. Arce, 2018. "On the cooperative and competitive aspects of strategic monitoring," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(3), pages 377-390, August.
    7. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Gianfranco Gambarelli & Daniele Gervasio & Francesca Maggioni & Daniel Faccini, 2022. "A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 295-307, June.
    9. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
    10. Daniel Arce, 1997. "Correlated strategies as Institutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 271-285, May.
    11. Piter Abdullah, 2010. "Kejahatan Perbankan dan Efektivitas Pengawasan Perbankan: Menggabungkan Teori Permainan dan Pendekatan Analytical Network Process," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 13(2), pages 215-234, October.
    12. Piter Abdullah, 2010. "Banking Crime Analysis And The Effectiveness Of Banking Supervision: Combining Game Theory And The Analytical Network Process Approach," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 13(2), pages 215-234, October.

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