Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction
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- Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
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Cited by:
- Helmuts Āzacis, 2020.
"Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions,"
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- Azacis, Helmuts, 2017. "Information Disclosure by a Seller in Sequential First-Price Auctions," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2017/2, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Hyeon Park, 2019. "Multi-bidder First Price Auction with Beliefs," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 7(1), pages 140-160, June.
- Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2014.
"Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 245-267, May.
- Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma," Working Papers 2010-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma," Working Papers 2010-20, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2017.
"First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 107-143, January.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2016.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Brooks, Benjamin A, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 10792, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 11782, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2016.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2015.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001031, UCLA Department of Economics.
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- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Search, Information, and Prices," Working Papers 2020-23, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
- Morris, Stephen & Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A, 2020. "Search, Information and Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 14521, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Search, Information, and Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2224R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2020.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Search, Information, and Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2224, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Search, Information, and Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2224R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2020.
- Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
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- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1926, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2014. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000898, David K. Levine.
- Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015.
"Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, P ter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
- Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
- Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bidder-optimal signal structure; Collusion; (Bayes) correlated equilibrium; First price auction; Public and private signals;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2012-05-15 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-15 (Microeconomics)
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