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Péter Vida
(Peter Vida)

Personal Details

First Name:Peter
Middle Name:
Last Name:Vida
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pvi223
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2006 Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics (BSE) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Universität Mannheim

Mannheim, Germany
http://www2.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/
RePEc:edi:fvmande (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Marie Laclau & Péter Vida & Helmuts Azacis, 2024. "Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case," THEMA Working Papers 2024-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2022. "Good cop-bad cop: delegating interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2022-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  3. Peter Vida & Takakazu Honryo & Helmuts Azacis, 2022. "Strong Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games," THEMA Working Papers 2022-08, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Post-Print hal-03637788, HAL.
  5. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida, 2021. "Designing Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2021-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  6. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Peter, 2021. "Fighting Collusion: An Implementation Theory Approach," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2021/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  7. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2015. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 517, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2015. "Repeated Implementation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 518, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  9. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2014. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans," Vienna Economics Papers vie1409, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  10. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 438, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  11. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, P ter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  12. Vida, P ter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  13. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo.
  14. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

Articles

  1. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2024. "Designing Interrogations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(6), pages 3504-3531.
  2. Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 102-112.
  3. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2021. "Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 867-889, December.
  4. Āzacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2019. "Repeated implementation: A practical characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 336-367.
  5. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
  6. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
  7. Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida, 2013. "Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 329-352, February.
  8. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Peter Vida & Takakazu Honryo & Helmuts Azacis, 2022. "Strong Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games," THEMA Working Papers 2022-08, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    Cited by:

    1. Ye Qiu & Ram C. Rao, 2024. "Can Merchants Benefit from Entry by (Amazon-Like) Platform if Multiagent Prices Signal Quality?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 778-796, July.

  2. Takakazu Honryo & Péter Vida, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Post-Print hal-03637788, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    2. Vaccari, Federico, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," FEEM Working Papers 329582, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    3. Peter Vida & Takakazu Honryo & Helmuts Azacis, 2022. "Strong Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games," THEMA Working Papers 2022-08, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    4. Fuhai Hong & Yu Pang, 2024. "Mitigation and adaptation: an informational perspective," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 57-92, January.
    5. Ye Qiu & Ram C. Rao, 2024. "Can Merchants Benefit from Entry by (Amazon-Like) Platform if Multiagent Prices Signal Quality?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 778-796, July.
    6. Barney Hartman‐Glaser & Benjamin Hébert, 2020. "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(1), pages 463-506, February.
    7. Minghua Chen & Konstantinos Serfes & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2023. "Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 1-31, March.
    8. Andreas Grunewald & Emanuel Hansen & Gert Pönitzsch, 2020. "Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 273-311, July.

  3. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2015. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 517, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2021. "Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 867-889, December.

  4. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2015. "Repeated Implementation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 518, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Azacis, Helmuts, 2017. "Repeated Implementation with Overlapping Generations of Agents," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2017/16, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    2. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Peter, 2021. "Fighting Collusion: An Implementation Theory Approach," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2021/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.

  5. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 438, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst, 2018. "Sender-receiver games with cooperation," Post-Print hal-02313962, HAL.
    2. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 477-486.
    3. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt68d1t1xg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    4. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2014. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans," Vienna Economics Papers vie1409, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    5. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2015. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 517, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2021. "Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 867-889, December.

  6. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, P ter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2016.
    2. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Search, Information, and Prices," Working Papers 2020-23, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    4. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    5. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    6. Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
    7. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
    8. Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 245-267, May.
    9. Azacis, Helmuts, 2017. "Information Disclosure by a Seller in Sequential First-Price Auctions," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2017/2, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    10. Hyeon Park, 2019. "Multi-bidder First Price Auction with Beliefs," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 7(1), pages 140-160, June.
    11. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    12. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1926, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  7. Vida, P ter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.

    Cited by:

    1. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo.
    2. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
    3. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

  8. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Dmitry Sedov, 2023. "Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 505-546, September.
    2. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.
    3. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
    4. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    5. Zhuozheng Li & Huanxing Yang & Lan Zhang, 2019. "Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 109-141, March.
    6. Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "The art of brevity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58681, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    8. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    9. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.

  9. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

    Cited by:

    1. Iván Major, 2006. "Why do (or do not) banks share customer information? A comparison of mature private credit markets and markets in transition," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0603, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, revised 24 Apr 2006.
    2. Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
    3. Gabor Virag, 2006. "Outside offers and bidding costs," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0610, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, revised 30 Aug 2006.
    4. Csóka, P. & Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á., 2006. "Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. András Simonovits, 2006. "Social Security Reform in the US: Lessons from Hungary," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0602, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, revised 24 Apr 2006.

Articles

  1. Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 102-112.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Āzacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2019. "Repeated implementation: A practical characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 336-367.

    Cited by:

    1. Azacis, Helmuts, 2017. "Repeated Implementation with Overlapping Generations of Agents," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2017/16, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.

  3. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida, 2013. "Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 329-352, February.

    Cited by:

    1. François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matías Núñez, 2024. "Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting," Post-Print halshs-04630490, HAL.
    2. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    3. Elkind, Edith & Grandi, Umberto & Rossi, Francesca & Slinko, Arkadii, 2020. "Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 193-205.
    4. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games," THEMA Working Papers 2013-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    5. Yasutora Watanabe & Kei Kawai, 2009. "Inferring Strategic Voting," 2009 Meeting Papers 803, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Menezes, Mozart B.C. & da Silveira, Giovani J.C. & Drezner, Zvi, 2016. "Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and Approval Voting compared with Median and Coverage locations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(1), pages 195-203.
    7. Giles, Adam & Postl, Peter, 2014. "Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 31-52.
    8. Postl, Peter, 2017. "Évaluation et comparaison des règles de vote derrière le voile de l’ignorance : Tour d'horizon sélectif et analyse des règles de scores à deux paramètres," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 249-290, Mars-Juin.
    9. Kurz, Sascha & Mayer, Alexander & Napel, Stefan, 2020. "Weighted committee games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(3), pages 972-979.
    10. Dellis, Arnaud, 2010. "Weak undominance in scoring rule elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 110-119, January.
    11. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2012. "Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2012-40, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    12. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 889-909, April.
    13. Christian Basteck, 2022. "Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 161-208, July.
    14. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, 2022. "The Trembling Chairman Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 51-56.

  6. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (9) 2012-05-15 2012-05-15 2013-11-02 2015-10-04 2015-10-04 2021-02-01 2021-08-23 2022-04-18 2024-10-14. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (6) 2012-05-15 2013-11-02 2015-10-04 2021-08-23 2022-04-18 2024-10-14. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2012-05-15 2013-11-02
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2021-08-23
  5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2021-02-01
  6. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2013-11-02
  7. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2021-08-23
  8. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (1) 2024-10-14
  9. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-08-23
  10. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2021-08-23
  11. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2021-08-23

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