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Equilibria in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information

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  • Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann’s [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact metric type and action spaces and payoff functions jointly measurable and continuous in actions, limits of Bayes-Nash equilibria of finite approximations to an infinite game are communication equilibria (and in general not Bayes-Nash equilibria) of the limit game. Another extension of Aumann’s [3] solution concept to the case of incomplete information fails to satisfy this condition.

Suggested Citation

  • Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2017. "Equilibria in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 201702, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:201702
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    infinite games of incomplete information; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; strategic approximation of an infinite game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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