Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
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- Yuhki Hosoya & Chaowen Yu, 2022. "On the approximate purification of mixed strategies in games with infinite action sets," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 69-93, May.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2021.
"Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 311-360, June.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2017. "Equilibria in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 201702, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2011. "Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 638-655, March.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997.
"The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, "undated". ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, "undated". "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013.
"Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015.
"Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, P ter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007.
"Belief Free Incomplete Information Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2011. "Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 656-671, March.
- Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011.
"Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000265, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1358, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 443-457, October.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013.
"Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
- Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Post-Print hal-01069192, HAL.
- Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
- Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2002. "Calibration and Bayesian learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 103-119, October.
- Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
- Capraro, Valerio & Scarsini, Marco, 2013. "Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-180.
- Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
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