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Note On Randomized Social Choice And Random Dictatorships

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  • Shasikanta Nandcibam

    (Delhi School of Economics)

Abstract

We show that rationalizability can be replaced by the weaker regularity condition in McLennan's [6] random dictatorship result for decision super-schemes. Our result also shows that, when there are at least three alternatives in the universal set, the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition of Pattanaik and Peleg [7] together with their requirement that there be at least two more alternatives in the universal set than there are individuals in the society can be replaced by strategy proofness to obtain an alternative characterization of random dictatorships.

Suggested Citation

  • Shasikanta Nandcibam, 1994. "Note On Randomized Social Choice And Random Dictatorships," Working papers 15, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-681, April.
    2. McLennan, Andrew, 1980. "Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-11, February.
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