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“What Gets Measured Gets Done”: Headteachers’ Responses to the English Secondary School

Author

Listed:
  • Deborah Wilson
  • Bronwyn Croxson
  • Adele Atkinson

Abstract

English secondary schools operate within a performance management system, which includes league tables reporting school performance across a number of indicators. This paper reports the results of an interview-based study, showing that head teachers care about their school’s place in the league tables, and that they believe this system affects behaviour. The effects they identify include some unintended consequences, not necessarily related to improved overall school performance, including focusing on borderline students who can boost a pivotal indicator: the number of students gaining five A*-Cs at GCSE. This behaviour reflects, in part, the dual role played by headteachers: they are both educationalists (serving the interests of all pupils); and school marketers, concerned with promoting the school to existing and prospective parents. The behaviour is also consistent with economic theory, which predicts a focus on that which is measured, potentially at the expense of that which is important, in sectors characterised by incomplete measurement, by multiple stakeholders and containing workers with diverse objectives. We conclude that, given that performance indicators do affect behaviour, it is important to minimise unintended consequences, and we suggest the use of value-added indicators of student performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Deborah Wilson & Bronwyn Croxson & Adele Atkinson, 2004. "“What Gets Measured Gets Done”: Headteachers’ Responses to the English Secondary School," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/107, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    • Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:04/107
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    File URL: http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/wp107.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carol Propper & Deborah Wilson, 2003. "The Use and Usefulness of Performance Measures in the Public Sector," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 19(2), pages 250-267, Summer.
    2. Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, 2002. "The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 91-114, Fall.
    3. Andy Wiggins & Peter Tymms, 2002. "Dysfunctional Effects of League Tables: A Comparison Between English and Scottish Primary Schools," Public Money & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 43-48, January.
    4. repec:rus:hseeco:122160 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ladd, Helen F., 1999. "The Dallas school accountability and incentive program: an evaluation of its impacts on student outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, February.
    6. David N. Figlio & Lawrence S. Getzler, 2002. "Accountability , Ability and Disability: Gaming the System," NBER Working Papers 9307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Le Grand, Julian, 2003. "Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199266999.
    8. Brian A. Jacob, 2002. "Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools," NBER Working Papers 8968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Daniel M. Koretz, 2002. "Limitations in the Use of Achievement Tests as Measures of Educators' Productivity," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 752-777.
    10. Deborah Wilson, 2004. "Which Ranking? The Impact of a 'Value-Added' Measure of Secondary School Performance," Public Money & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 37-45.
    11. Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Deborah Wilson, 2002. "Does Performance Monitoring Work? A Review of the Evidence from the UK Public Sector, Excluding Health Care," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/049, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:wvu:wpaper:07-03 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gian Luigi Albano & Clare Leaver, 2005. "Transparency, Recuitment and Retention in the Public Sector," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/132, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    3. Clare Leaver & Gian Luigi Albano & University College London and ELSE, 2004. "Transparency, Recruitment and Retention in the Public Sector," Economics Series Working Papers 219, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Simon Burgess & Brendon McConnell & Carol Propper & Deborah Wilson, 2004. "Sorting and Choice in English Secondary Schools," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/111, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:9:y:2008:i:29:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Johansson Vicki, 2015. "When will we ever learn ?," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 8(2), pages 149-170, December.
    7. Justin Ross, 2008. "A theoretical model of the distribution of teacher attention under benchmark testing," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 9(29), pages 1-8.
    8. Deborah Wilson & Anete Piebalga, 2008. "Accurate performance measure but meaningless ranking exercise? An analysis of the English school league tables," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 07/176, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    education; performance measures;

    JEL classification:

    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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