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A Structural Analysis of Vacancy Referrals with Imperfect Monitoring and the Strategic Use of Sickness Absence

Author

Listed:
  • Gerard J. van den Berg

    (University of Groningen)

  • Hanno Foerster

    (Boston College)

  • Arne Uhlendorff

    (CNRS)

Abstract

This paper provides a structural analysis of the role of job vacancy referrals (VRs) by Employment Agencies in the job search behavior of unemployed individuals, incorporating in- stitutional features of the monitoring of search behavior by the agencies. Notably, rejections of VRs may lead to sanctions (temporary benefits reductions) while workers may report sick to avoid those. We estimate models using German administrative data from social security records linked with caseworker recorded data on VRs, sick reporting and sanctions. The anal- ysis highlights the influence of aspects of the health care system on unemployment durations. We estimate that for around 25% of unemployed workers, removing the channel that enables strategic sick reporting reduces the mean unemployment duration by 8 days.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerard J. van den Berg & Hanno Foerster & Arne Uhlendorff, 2021. "A Structural Analysis of Vacancy Referrals with Imperfect Monitoring and the Strategic Use of Sickness Absence," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1042, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 17 Sep 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:1042
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment; wage; unemployment insurance; monitoring; moral hazard; struc- tural estimation; counterfactual policy evaluation; unemployment duration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • C54 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Quantitative Policy Modeling

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