IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-04793423.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Evaluating Vacancy Referrals and the Roles of Sanctions and Sickness Absence

Author

Listed:
  • Gerard van den Berg
  • Barbara Hofmann
  • Arne Uhlendorff

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Job vacancy referrals are a common active labor market policy measure. Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. During sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behaviour do not apply. This may reduce the threat effect of sanctions. We study effects of vacancy referrals and sanctions on unemployment durations and job match quality. We find that a vacancy referral increases the transition rate into work. We also find a positive effect of a vacancy referral on the probability of reporting sick.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerard van den Berg & Barbara Hofmann & Arne Uhlendorff, 2019. "Evaluating Vacancy Referrals and the Roles of Sanctions and Sickness Absence," Post-Print halshs-04793423, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04793423
    DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez032
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. De Brouwer, Octave & Leduc, Elisabeth & Tojerow, Ilan, 2023. "The consequences of job search monitoring for the long-term unemployed: Disability instead of employment?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    2. Gerard J. van den Berg & Arne Uhlendorff & Joachim Wolff, 2022. "The Impact of Sanctions for Young Welfare Recipients on Transitions to Work and Wages, and on Dropping Out," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(353), pages 1-28, January.
    3. Gerard J. van den Berg & Hanno Foerster & Arne Uhlendorff, 2019. "Structural Empirical Analysis of Vacancy Referrals With Imperfect Monitoring and the Strategic Use of Sickness Absence," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_123v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    4. Márton Csilalg & Lili Márk, 2023. "The Incentive Effects of Sickness Benefit for the Unemployed – Analysis of a Reduction in Potential Benefit Duration," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 2317, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. Marco Caliendo & Robert Mahlstedt & Gerard J. van den Berg & Johan Vikström, 2023. "Side effects of labor market policies," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 339-375, April.
    6. Cheung, Maria & Egebark, Johan & Forslund, Anders & Laun, Lisa & Rödin, Magnus & Vikström, Johan, 2019. "Does job search assistance reduce unemployment? Experimental evidence on displacement effects and mechanisms," Working Paper Series 2019:25, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    7. Gerard J. van den Berg & Hanno Foerster & Arne Uhlendorff, 2021. "A Structural Analysis of Vacancy Referrals with Imperfect Monitoring and the Strategic Use of Sickness Absence," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1042, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 17 Sep 2023.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04793423. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.