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Deliberation and epistemic democracy

Author

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  • Huihui Ding

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

  • Marcus Pivato

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

We study the effects of deliberation on epistemic social choice, in two settings. In the first setting, the group faces a binary epistemic decision analogous to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In the second setting, group members have probabilistic beliefs arising from their private information, and the group wants to aggregate these beliefs in a way that makes optimal use of this information. During deliberation, each agent discloses private information to persuade the other agents of her current views. But her views may also evolve over time, as she learns from other agents. This process will improve the performance of the group, but only under certain conditions; these involve the nature of the social decision rule, the group size, and also the presence of "neutral agents" whom the other agents try to persuade.

Suggested Citation

  • Huihui Ding & Marcus Pivato, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Post-Print hal-03637874, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03637874
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.020
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    Cited by:

    1. Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022. "Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 22011rr, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Jun 2024.
    2. Chaim Fershtman & Uzi Segal, 2024. "Social influence in committee deliberation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 185-207, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deliberation; Epistemic social choice; Condorcet Jury Theorem; Probabilistic belief aggregation; Multiplicative pooling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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