Optimal tie-breaking rules
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Goel, Sumit & Goyal, Amit, 2023. "Optimal tie-breaking rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
References listed on IDEAS
- Szech, Nora, 2015. "Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 138-149.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000.
"Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 22-43, January.
- Che,Y.K. & Gale,I., 1998. "Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions," Working papers 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Yizhaq Minchuk, 2022. "Winner‐pay contests with a no‐winner possibility," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1874-1879, September.
- Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Jun Zhang, 2016.
"Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry,"
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(1), pages 52-75, February.
- Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Jun Zhang, 2016. "Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 52-75, February.
- David Malueg & Andrew Yates, 2006. "Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 719-727, April.
- J. Amegashie, 2006.
"A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 135-144, January.
- Amegashie, J.A., 2003. "A Contest Success Function with a Tractable Noise Parameter," Working Papers 2003-5, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022.
"Simple equilibria in general contests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2019. "A general framework for studying contests," MPRA Paper 97363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 005, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2020. "A general framework for studying contests," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224601, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2019. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7993, CESifo.
- Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018.
"Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
- Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser, 2016. "Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6274, CESifo.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290, February.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 263-270, Springer.
- Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014.
"Tournaments with gaps,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 211-214.
- Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Tournaments with Gaps," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 411, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013.
"Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
- Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Contest Functions: Theoretical Foundations and Issues in Estimation," Working Papers 111214, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2010. "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 267-276, March.
- Glenn C. Loury, 1979.
"Market Structure and Innovation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
- Glenn C. Loury, 1976. "Market Structure and Innovation," Discussion Papers 256, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017.
"Biased contests for symmetric players,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
- Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2016. "Biased contests for symmetric players," MPRA Paper 75378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Maya Eden, 2006.
"Optimal Ties in Contests,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp430, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Maya Eden, 2006. "Optimal Ties in Contests," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000374, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ewerhart, Christian, 2017.
"Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 167-170.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2017. "Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players," ECON - Working Papers 243, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Deng, Shanglyu & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2018. "Incentives in lottery contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 1-5.
- Lorens Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Ex post unbalanced tournaments," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 73-98, February.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023.
"Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007.
"Economics of Conflict: An Overview,"
Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709,
Elsevier.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
- Nti, Kofi O., 2004. "Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1059-1066, November.
- Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
- Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 21-43, Spring.
- Michael C. Fu, 2015. "Overview of the Handbook," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Michael C Fu (ed.), Handbook of Simulation Optimization, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 1-7, Springer.
- Hao Jia, 2012. "Contests with the Probability of a Draw: A Stochastic Foundation," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 391-406, September.
- Alberto Vesperoni & Anil Yildizparlak, 2019. "Contests With Draws: Axiomatization And Equilibrium," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(3), pages 1597-1616, July.
- Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023. "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
- Nti, Kofi O, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59, February.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2021. "A typology of military conflict based on the Hirshleifer contest," ECON - Working Papers 400, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
- Kyung Hwan Baik, 2004. "Two-Player Asymmetric Contests with Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(4), pages 679-689, October.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989.
"Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success,"
Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 251-262,
Springer.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
- Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 1-7, February.
- Wang Zhewei, 2010. "The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-18, April.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1998. "Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 685-701, November.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023. "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023.
"Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
- Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013.
"Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
- Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Contest Functions: Theoretical Foundations and Issues in Estimation," Working Papers 111214, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Ewerhart, Christian, 2017.
"Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," ECON - Working Papers 186, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2017.
- Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018.
"On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests,"
Working Papers
id:12840, eSocialSciences.
- Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018. "On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests," Working papers 288, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Alberto Vesperoni, 2016.
"A contest success function for rankings,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 905-937, December.
- Vesperoni, Alberto, 2013. "A contest success function for rankings," NEPS Working Papers 8/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
- Franke, Jörg & Metzger, Lars P., 2023. "Repeated Contests with Draws," Ruhr Economic Papers 1016, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Ewerhart, Christian & Sun, Guang-Zhen, 2024.
"The n-player Hirshleifer contest,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 300-320.
- Christian Ewerhart & Guang-Zhen Sun, 2020. "The n-player Hirshleifer contest," ECON - Working Papers 361, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2023.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2023.
"Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2020. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," Diskussionsschriften dp2011, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2022. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," CEPR Discussion Papers 14854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018.
"Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
- Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser, 2016. "Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6274, CESifo.
- Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Technologies of Conflict," Working Papers 101111, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Raul Caruso, 2008.
"Reciprocity in the shadow of threat,"
International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
- Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Recirpcity in the shadow of Threat," MPRA Paper 1788, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022.
"All-pay auctions with ties,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1183-1231, November.
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2016. "All-Pay Auctions with Ties," Working Papers 16-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015.
"Behavior in All-Pay Auctions with Ties,"
Working Papers
15-22, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Gelder, Alan & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "Behavior in All-Pay Auctions with Ties," MPRA Paper 67517, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auctions," ECON - Working Papers 155, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Deng, Shanglyu & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2018. "Incentives in lottery contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 1-5.
- Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang, 2009.
"Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports,"
Working Papers
0029, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
- Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang, 2009. "Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports," Working Papers 0105, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
- Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang, 2009. "Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports," Working Papers 0913, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists, revised Mar 2011.
- René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Microfounded Contest Design," Working Papers 2003, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Mildenberger, Carl David & Pietri, Antoine, 2018. "How does size matter for military success? Evidence from virtual worlds," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 137-155.
- Marco Sahm, 2022. "Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players," CESifo Working Paper Series 9601, CESifo.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2023-05-29 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2023-05-29 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2023-05-29 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2304.13866. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.