Repeated Contests with Draws
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.4419/96973182
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Szech, Nora, 2015. "Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 138-149.
- Alberto Vesperoni & Anil Yildizparlak, 2019. "Contests With Draws: Axiomatization And Equilibrium," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(3), pages 1597-1616, July.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
- Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023. "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
- Nti, Kofi O, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 43-59, February.
- Yizhaq Minchuk, 2022. "Winner‐pay contests with a no‐winner possibility," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1874-1879, September.
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022.
"All-pay auctions with ties,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1183-1231, November.
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2016. "All-Pay Auctions with Ties," Working Papers 16-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Dasgupta, Ani & Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Designing an optimal contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 587-603, November.
- Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2010. "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 267-276, March.
- Glenn C. Loury, 1979.
"Market Structure and Innovation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
- Glenn C. Loury, 1976. "Market Structure and Innovation," Discussion Papers 256, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Deng, Shanglyu & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2018. "Incentives in lottery contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 1-5.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2017.
"The All‐Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 375-390, October.
- Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, 2010. "The All-Pay Auction with Non-Monotonic Payoff," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-06, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Gama, Adriana & Rietzke, David, 2019. "Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: Contests and Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 823-841.
- Martin Kaae Jensen, 2016. "Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Pierre von Mouche & Federico Quartieri (ed.), Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, pages 233-244, Springer.
- Hao Jia, 2012. "Contests with the Probability of a Draw: A Stochastic Foundation," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 391-406, September.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Goel, Sumit & Goyal, Amit, 2023.
"Optimal tie-breaking rules,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
- Sumit Goel & Amit Goyal, 2023. "Optimal tie-breaking rules," Papers 2304.13866, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
- Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023. "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
- Ewerhart, Christian, 2017.
"The lottery contest is a best-response potential game,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 168-171.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2017. "The lottery contest is a best-response potential game," ECON - Working Papers 242, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Mar 2017.
- Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013.
"Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
- Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Contest Functions: Theoretical Foundations and Issues in Estimation," Working Papers 111214, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Gama, Adriana & Rietzke, David, 2019. "Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: Contests and Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 823-841.
- James W. Boudreau & Shane Sanders & Nicholas Shunda, 2019.
"The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 249-266, June.
- Boudreau, James W. & Sanders, Shane & Shunda, Nicholas, 2017. "The Role of Noise in Alliance Formation and Collusion in Conflicts," MPRA Paper 81533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022.
"All-pay auctions with ties,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1183-1231, November.
- Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2016. "All-Pay Auctions with Ties," Working Papers 16-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Anil Yildizparlak, 2018. "An Application of Contest Success Functions for Draws on European Soccer," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 19(8), pages 1191-1212, December.
- Adriana Gama & David Michael Rietzke, 2017. "Robust Comparative Statics in Contests," Working Papers 173174403, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Alice Guerra & Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2019. "Productive and unproductive competition: a unified framework," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(3), pages 785-804, October.
- Yizhaq Minchuk, 2022. "Winner‐pay contests with a no‐winner possibility," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1874-1879, September.
- Kyung Hwan Baik & Jong Hwa Lee, 2013. "Endogenous Timing In Contests With Delegation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2044-2055, October.
- Wasser, Cédric, 2013.
"A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 180-182.
- Wasser, Cédric, 2010. "Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 331, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023.
"Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
- Leppälä, Samuli, 2021. "A partially exclusive rent-seeking contest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 60-75.
- Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018.
"On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests,"
Working Papers
id:12840, eSocialSciences.
- Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018. "On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests," Working papers 288, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2011.
"Political culture and discrimination in contests,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 88-93.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2011. "Political culture and discrimination in contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1-2), pages 88-93, February.
- Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 3170, CESifo.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2010. "Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests," IZA Discussion Papers 5158, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests," Working Papers 2010-18, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- repec:zbw:rwirep:0130 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kenan Huremović, 2021.
"A noncooperative model of contest network formation,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(2), pages 275-317, April.
- Kenan Huremovic, 2015. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," AMSE Working Papers 1521, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Feb 2015.
- Kenan Huremovic, 2016. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," Working Papers halshs-01154676, HAL.
- Kenan Huremovic, 2019. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," Papers 1901.07605, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
- Alberto Vesperoni, 2016.
"A contest success function for rankings,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 905-937, December.
- Vesperoni, Alberto, 2013. "A contest success function for rankings," NEPS Working Papers 8/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
- Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2013.
"Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation,"
Working Papers
2013-09, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef, 2013. "Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation," IZA Discussion Papers 7736, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
More about this item
Keywords
Contest theory; repeated contest; dynamic contest; contest with draws;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2023-07-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MFD-2023-07-10 (Microfinance)
- NEP-MIC-2023-07-10 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:1016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rwiesde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.