Winner‐pay contests with a no‐winner possibility
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1002/mde.3495
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011.
"A generalized Tullock contest,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "A generalized Tullock contest," Working Papers 10-08, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Sheremeta, Roman & Chowdhury, Subhasish, 2010. "A generalized Tullock contest," MPRA Paper 52102, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Cohen Chen & Sela Aner, 2007.
"Contests with Ties,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, December.
- Chen Cohen & Aner Sela, 2005. "Contests With Ties," Working Papers 0511, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Cohen, Daniel & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Contests with Ties," CEPR Discussion Papers 5132, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yizhaq Minchuk, 2021. "Reimbursement as a tool to reduce sabotaging in rent‐seeking contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 235-238, January.
- Andrew Yates, 2011. "Winner-pay contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 93-106, April.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
- Skaperdas, Stergios & Gan, Li, 1995. "Risk Aversion in Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(431), pages 951-962, July.
- Deng, Shanglyu & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2018. "Incentives in lottery contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 1-5.
- Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 2015. "Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15325, March.
- Alberto Vesperoni & Anil Yildizparlak, 2019. "Contests With Draws: Axiomatization And Equilibrium," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(3), pages 1597-1616, July.
- Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2009. "Tullock’s contest with reimbursements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 49-63, October.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Franke, Jörg & Metzger, Lars P., 2023. "Repeated Contests with Draws," Ruhr Economic Papers 1016, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Goel, Sumit & Goyal, Amit, 2023.
"Optimal tie-breaking rules,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
- Sumit Goel & Amit Goyal, 2023. "Optimal tie-breaking rules," Papers 2304.13866, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2015.
"Strategically equivalent contests,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(4), pages 587-601, April.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "Strategically Equivalent Contests," MPRA Paper 55450, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Roman M. Sheremeta & Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2014. "Strategically Equivalent Contests," Working Papers 14-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2020.
"Contests with insurance,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 1-22, June.
- Sela, Aner & Minchuk, Yizhaq, 2017. "Contests with Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 12456, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015.
"A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
- Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2012. "A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments," Working Papers 12-22, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments," MPRA Paper 59714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-109, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Yizhaq Minchuk, 2021. "Reimbursement as a tool to reduce sabotaging in rent‐seeking contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 235-238, January.
- Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011.
"A generalized Tullock contest,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.
- Sheremeta, Roman & Chowdhury, Subhasish, 2010. "A generalized Tullock contest," MPRA Paper 52102, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "A generalized Tullock contest," Working Papers 10-08, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2016. "Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization," Discussion Papers 2016-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie & Petros G. Sekeris, 2016. "Sharing contests with general preferences," Discussion Papers Series 573, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Nicolas Treich, 2017.
"Risky rents,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 151-164, October.
- Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Nicolas Treich, 2016. "Risky rents," Post-Print hal-01604261, HAL.
- Guigou, Jean-Daniel & Lovat, Bruno & Treich, Nicolas, 2016. "Risky Rents," TSE Working Papers 16-710, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Franke, Jörg & Metzger, Lars P., 2023. "Repeated Contests with Draws," Ruhr Economic Papers 1016, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Einav Hart & Judith Avrahami & Yaakov Kareev, 2016. "Enlarging the market yet decreasing the profit: An experimental study of competitive behavior when investment affects the prize," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 11(4), pages 380-390, July.
- Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Sekeris, Petros G., 2018. "Rent-seeking incentives in share contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 53-62.
- Damian S. Damianov & Shane Sanders & Anil Yildizparlak, 2018. "Asymmetric endogenous prize contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 435-453, October.
- Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023. "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
- Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2023. "The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 841-885, April.
- repec:cup:judgdm:v:11:y:2016:i:4:p:380-390 is not listed on IDEAS
- Corchón, Luis & Dahm, Matthias, 2011.
"Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 309-317.
- Corchon, Luis, 2009. "Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit," MPRA Paper 18761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Corchón, Luis C. & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit," Working Papers 2072/148481, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Alice Guerra & Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2019. "Productive and unproductive competition: a unified framework," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(3), pages 785-804, October.
- Roman Sheremeta, 2018.
"Experimental Research on Contests,"
Working Papers
18-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2018. "Experimental Research on Contests," MPRA Paper 89327, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016.
"Where are the rent seekers?,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
- Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the Rent Seekers?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5833, CESifo.
- Hillman, Arye L. & Metsuyanim, Kfir & Potrafke, Niklas, 2015.
"Democracy with group identity,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 274-287.
- Arye L. Hillman & Kfir Metsuyanim & Niklas Potrafke, 2015. "Democracy with Group Identity," CESifo Working Paper Series 5281, CESifo.
- Arye L. Hillman & Kfir Metsuyanim & Niklas Potrafke, 2015. "Democracy With Group Identity," Working Papers 2015-02, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Szech, Nora, 2023.
"Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
- Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," MPRA Paper 71202, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions," Working Paper Series in Economics 88, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Roman M. Sheremeta & Nora Szech, 2016. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5955, CESifo.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Roman M. Sheremeta & Nora Szech, 2016. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 796, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Roman M. Sheremeta & Nora Szech, 2016. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 16-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2016-307, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman & Szech, Nora, 2020. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Studie of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224585, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:6:p:1874-1879. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.