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Power Markets with Information-Aware Self-scheduling Electric Vehicles

Author

Listed:
  • F. Selin Yanikara

    (Boston University)

  • Panagiotis Andrianesis

    (Boston University)

  • Michael Caramanis

    (Boston University)

Abstract

We consider multi-period (24-h day-ahead) multi-commodity (energy and regulation reserves) decentralized electricity transmission and distribution (T&D) market designs. Whereas conventional centralized generators with uniform price quantity offers are scheduled by a transmission system operator, low-voltage network-connected distributed energy resources (DERs) with complex preferences and requirements, such as electric vehicles (EVs), are allowed to self-schedule adapting to spatiotemporal marginal cost-based prices. We model the salient characteristics of interconnected T&D networks, and we consider self-scheduling DER responses under alternative distribution network information-aware or information-unaware market designs. Moreover, we consider a single (EV load aggregator) network information-aware scheduler market design. Our contribution is the characterization and comparative analysis—analytic as well as numerical—of equilibria, using game-theoretical approaches to prove existence and uniqueness, and the investigation of the role of information on self-scheduling and EV aggregator coordinated EV scheduling. Finally, we derive conclusions on the impact to social welfare and distributional equity of information-aware/information-unaware self-scheduling as well as single EV aggregator scheduling and implications that are relevant to market design and policy considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • F. Selin Yanikara & Panagiotis Andrianesis & Michael Caramanis, 2020. "Power Markets with Information-Aware Self-scheduling Electric Vehicles," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 930-967, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:10:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-019-00331-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-019-00331-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Voorneveld, Mark, 2000. "Best-response potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 289-295, March.
    2. Moulin, Herve, 1984. "Dominance solvability and cournot stability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Jip & Bialek, Sylwia & Ünel, Burçin & Dvorkin, Yury, 2022. "Impact of imperfect foresight on the optimal DER deployment, remuneration and policy," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 326(C).

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