Report NEP-DES-2024-07-08

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Guillaume Haeringer issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Yoav Kolumbus & Joe Halpern & 'Eva Tardos, 2024. "Paying to Do Better: Games with Payments between Learning Agents," Papers 2405.20880, arXiv.org.
• Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller, 2024. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 308, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
• Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Eicke, Anselm & Hirth, Lion & Ocker, Fabian & Ott, Marion & Schlecht, Ingmar & Wang, Runxi, 2024. "Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-025, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
• Marco Bornstein & Amrit Singh Bedi & Abdirisak Mohamed & Furong Huang, 2024. "FACT or Fiction: Can Truthful Mechanisms Eliminate Federated Free Riding?," Papers 2405.13879, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
• Michela Carlana & Enrico Miglino & Michela M. Tincani, 2024. "How Far Can Inclusion Go? The Long-term Impacts of Preferential College Admissions," NBER Working Papers 32525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024. "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers ECARES 2024-10, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.