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A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms

Author

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  • Aram Grigoryan
  • Markus Möller

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller, 2025. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_652, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_652
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp652
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    Keywords

    Matching and Allocation; Auditability; Deviation Detection; In centralized mechanisms and platforms; participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence; if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism; participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes of allocation mechanisms.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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