Bilateral information asymmetry and irreversible practice adoption through agri-environmental policy: an application to peat land retirement in Norway
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.204212
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Keywords
Environmental Economics and Policy;NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-AGR-2015-05-16 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2015-05-16 (Environmental Economics)
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