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Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas

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  • Signe Anthon
  • Serge Garcia
  • Anne Stenger

Abstract

The implementation of nature conservation policy is often based on contracts between public authorities and landowners. In this article, we model incentive contracts in forest areas in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard when the conservation outcome is uncertain ex ante but observable ex post. The results show that agents who are likely to achieve a higher level of conservation should be offered a contract where transfers depend on the final outcome, with a bonus for a high ecological level of the forest. When conservation measures are correlated with forest management, we show that the contractual measures involve distorted transfers. We analyse the payment mechanisms used in France and Denmark in the context of the Natura 2000 policy. These mechanisms result in overcompensation and under-performance since they do not take the problem of moral hazard and natural variability into account.
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Suggested Citation

  • Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2010. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation in Forest Areas," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 281-302, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:46:y:2010:i:3:p:281-302
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-009-9341-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Reed, Mark S. & Moxey, Andrew & Prager, Katrin & Hanley, Nick & Skates, James & Bonn, Aletta & Evans, Chris D. & Glenk, Klaus & Thomson, Ken, 2014. "Improving the link between payments and the provision of ecosystem services in agri-environment schemes," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 9(C), pages 44-53.
    2. Nick Hanley & Simanti Banerjee & Gareth D. Lennox & Paul R. Armsworth, 2012. "How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 28(1), pages 93-113, Spring.
    3. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2015. "Contracts for afforestation and the role of monitoring for landowners’ willingness to accept," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-37.
    4. Valatin, G. & Ovando, P. & Abildtrup, J. & Accastello, C. & Andreucci, M.B. & Chikalanov, A. & El Mokaddem, A. & Garcia, S. & Gonzalez-Sanchis, M. & Gordillo, F. & Kayacan, B. & Little, D. & Lyubenova, 2022. "Approaches to cost-effectiveness of payments for tree planting and forest management for water quality services," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    5. Geitzenauer, Maria & Blondet, Marieke & de Koning, Jessica & Ferranti, Francesca & Sotirov, Metodi & Weiss, Gerhard & Winkel, Georg, 2017. "The challenge of financing the implementation of Natura 2000 – Empirical evidence from six European Union Member States," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 3-13.
    6. Katsuya Tanaka & Nicholas Hanley & Laure Kuhfuss, 2022. "Farmers’ preferences toward an outcome‐based payment for ecosystem service scheme in Japan," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 720-738, September.
    7. Hily, Emeline & Garcia, Serge & Stenger, Anne & Tu, Gengyang, 2015. "Assessing the cost-effectiveness of a biodiversity conservation policy: A bio-econometric analysis of Natura 2000 contracts in forest," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-208.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse selection; Conservation contracts; Forest; Incentives; Limited liability; Moral hazard; Natura 2000; Uncertain outcome; D82; Q23; Q57;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics

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