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Animal Disease Related Pre-event Investment and Post-event Compensation: A Multi-agent Problem

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  • Jin, Yanhong H.
  • McCarl, Bruce A.

Abstract

We employ a game-theoretic principal agent framework to analyze the individual farmer and governmental behavior pre- and post-animal disease outbreak. We examine the gap between the privately optimal and socially optimal levels of ex ante biosecurity investment and then investigate how a well-designed differentiated compensation scheme can close this gap. Our results also show that the privately optimal investment is generally lower than the first best socially optimal level, and a well-designed differentiated compensation scheme conditional on ex ante biosecurity investment can induce private preventive investment at least greater than the second best socially optimal level when the government face constraints, or even increase approaching the first best socially optimal level. Furthermore, our results suggest that compensation schemes be expanded to encompass features that provide incentives for ex ante biosecurity investment and ex post truthful disclosure. Specifically inclusion of the following two mechanisms is warranted: (a) a penalty for farms who are found to have disease incidence but have not disclosed that information.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin, Yanhong H. & McCarl, Bruce A., 2006. "Animal Disease Related Pre-event Investment and Post-event Compensation: A Multi-agent Problem," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21216, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea06:21216
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21216
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles E. Hyde & James A. Vercammen, 1997. "Costly Yield Verification, Moral Hazard, And Crop Insurance Contract Form," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1‐3), pages 393-407, January.
    2. Kuchler, Fred & Hamm, Shannon, 2000. "Animal disease incidence and indemnity eradication programs," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 299-308, April.
    3. Gramig, Benjamin M. & Horan, Richard D. & Wolf, Christopher A., 2005. "A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19200, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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    Cited by:

    1. Seo, S. Niggol, 2010. "Is an integrated farm more resilient against climate change? A micro-econometric analysis of portfolio diversification in African agriculture," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 32-40, February.

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