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Ex post Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification or Falsification?

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  • R M Rejesus

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which actual crop insurance indemnification behaviour conforms to the theoretical predictions of two ex post moral hazard models ? costly state verification and costly state falsification ? and then explores whether the closely conforming model can indeed help deter ex post moral hazard in the United States (US) crop insurance program. The results suggest that indemnification behaviour in crop insurance is more in line with the costly state verification model. Following the theoretical predictions of the costly state verification model, however, may not be the optimal policy to deter ex post moral hazard since it is possible for insured producers to deceive loss adjusters and for loss magnitudes to not be truthfully verified.

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  • R M Rejesus, 2003. "Ex post Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification or Falsification?," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 8(2), pages 29-46, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eis:articl:203rejesus
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    1. Lacker, Jeffrey M & Weinberg, John A, 1989. "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1345-1363, December.
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    7. Hardle, Wolfgang & Linton, Oliver, 1986. "Applied nonparametric methods," Handbook of Econometrics, in: R. F. Engle & D. McFadden (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 38, pages 2295-2339, Elsevier.
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    1. Rejesus, R. & Park, S. & Zheng, X. & Goodwin, G., 2018. "How does a Fraud Mitigation Program Influence Insurance Claims filing Behavior? Evidence from the "Spot Check List" Program in U.S. Crop Insurance," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277452, International Association of Agricultural Economists.

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