Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States before the Great Depression
In: Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History
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Cited by:
- Eric Hilt, 2014.
"History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics,"
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- Eric Hilt, 2014. "History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics," NBER Working Papers 20356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eric Hilt, 2014.
"Corporate Governance and the Development of Manufacturing Enterprises in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts,"
NBER Chapters, in: Enterprising America: Businesses, Banks, and Credit Markets in Historical Perspective, pages 73-102,
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- Eric Hilt, 2014. "Corporate Governance and the Development of Manufacturing Enterprises in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts," NBER Working Papers 20096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Coyle, Christopher & Musacchio, Aldo & Turner, John D., 2019.
"Law and finance in Britain c.1900,"
Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 267-293, December.
- Coyle, Christopher & Musacchio, Aldo & Turner, John D., 2019. "Law and finance in Britain c.1900," QUCEH Working Paper Series 2019-05, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
- Coyle, Christopher & Musacchio, Aldo & Turner, John D., 2019. "Law and Finance in Britain c.1900," QBS Working Paper Series 2019/11, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
- Guinnane, Timothy & Harris, Ron & Lamoreaux, Naomi R. & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 2007.
"Putting the Corporation in its Place,"
Enterprise & Society, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 687-729, September.
- Timothy Guinnane & Ron Harris & Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2007. "Putting the Corporation in its Place," NBER Working Papers 13109, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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"For Every Law, a Loophole: Flexibility in the Menu of Spanish Business Forms, 1886-1936,"
Center Discussion Papers
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- Timothy W. Guinnane & Susana Martinez Rodriguez, 2012. "For Every Law, a Loophole: Flexibility in the Menu of Spanish Business Forms, 1886-1936," Working Papers 1012, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Guinnane, Timothy W> & Martinez Rodriguez, Susana, 2012. "For Every Law, a Loophole: Flexibility in the Menu of Spanish Business Forms, 1886-1936," Working Papers 103, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Ran Abramitzky & Zephyr Frank & Aprajit Mahajan, 2009. "Inside the Black Box: Partnerships in Rio de Janeiro, 1870-1891," Discussion Papers 08-044, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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"Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth, and Politics in New York, 1791–1826,"
The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 332-363, May.
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"Historical financing of small- and medium-size enterprises,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 3017-3042, November.
- Robert Cull & Lance E. Davis & Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2005. "Historical Financing of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 11695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Oscar Gelderblom & Joost Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, 2017.
"The Emergence of the Corporate Form,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 193-236.
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- HANNAH, Leslie, 2018. "Corporate Governance, Accounting Transparency and Stock Exchange Sizes in Germany, Japan and “Anglo-Saxon” Economies, 1870-1950," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-77, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
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JEL classification:
- N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
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