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Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm

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  • MAIJA HALONEN‐AKATWIJUKA

Abstract

Focus (specialization) improves productivity but leads to more dependency and opens a door for holdup problems. We analyse how organizational design interacts with the allocation of ownership in minimizing the holdup problem. We identify a new cost of integration: inefficient organizational design in an integrated firm. We also show that the boundaries of the firm depend on technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Maija Halonen‐Akatwijuka, 2010. "Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(307), pages 544-564, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:77:y:2010:i:307:p:544-564
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2008.00767.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Sautel & Cécile Cézanne, 2007. "The Human Capital-Intensive Firm and Coordination: Redefined Integration and Disintegration," Working Papers hal-00628647, HAL.
    2. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2008. "Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 229-241, June.
    3. Olivier Sautel, 2007. "L'évolution de la théorie des contrats incomplets face à la dé-intégration verticale," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 5-5.
    4. Cécile Cézanne & Olivier Sautel, 2007. "Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration," Post-Print hal-00331454, HAL.
    5. Cécile CEZANNE & Laurence SAGLIETTO, 2014. "Human Capital-Intensive Firms and Symbolic Value Creation," Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business, West University of Timisoara, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 7(1), pages 70-88.
    6. Deng, Zhongqi & Song, Shunfeng & Chen, Yongjun, 2016. "Private participation in infrastructure project and its impact on the project cost," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 63-76.
    7. repec:hal:cepnwp:hal-00628647 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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