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Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth, and Politics in New York, 1791–1826

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  • HILT, ERIC
  • VALENTINE, JACQUELINE

Abstract

Using newly collected data, this article compares the wealth and status of New York City households who owned corporate stock to the general population both in 1791, when there were only two corporations in the state, and in 1826, when there were hundreds. The results indicate that although corporate stock was held principally by the city's elite merchants in both periods, share ownership became more widespread over time among less affluent households. In particular, later corporations were owned and managed by investors who were less wealthy than the stockholders of corporations created in earlier, less democratic periods.

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  • Hilt, Eric & Valentine, Jacqueline, 2012. "Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth, and Politics in New York, 1791–1826," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 332-363, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:72:y:2012:i:02:p:332-363_00
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    1. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 2014. "Revisiting American Exceptionalism: Democracy and the Regulation of Corporate Governance in Nineteenth-Century Pennsylvania," NBER Working Papers 20231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Eric Hilt, 2014. "History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, December.
    3. Eric Hilt, 2014. "Corporate Governance and the Development of Manufacturing Enterprises in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts," NBER Chapters, in: Enterprising America: Businesses, Banks, and Credit Markets in Historical Perspective, pages 73-102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Qian Lu & John Joseph Wallis, 2015. "Banks, Politics, and Political Parties: From Partisan Banking to Open Access in Early Massachusetts," NBER Working Papers 21572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Saumitra Jha, 2012. "Sharing the Future: Financial Innovation and Innovators in Solving the Political Economy Challenges of Development," International Economic Association Series, in: Masahiko Aoki & Timur Kuran & Gérard Roland (ed.), Institutions and Comparative Economic Development, chapter 7, pages 131-151, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Qian Lu & John Joseph Wallis, 2017. "Banks, Politics, and Political Parties: From Partisan Banking to Open Access in Early Massachusetts," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 109-145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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