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Unions, the Costs of Job Loss, and Vacation

In: Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States

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  • Fumio Ohtake

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  • Fumio Ohtake, 2003. "Unions, the Costs of Job Loss, and Vacation," NBER Chapters, in: Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, pages 371-390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10313
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven G. Allen, 1981. "Compensation, Safety, and Absenteeism: Evidence from the Paper Industry," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 34(2), pages 207-218, January.
    2. Hildreth, Andrew K. G. & Ohtake, Fumio, 1998. "Labor Demand and the Structure of Adjustment Costs in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 131-150, June.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy,Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 376-414, July.
    4. Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G, 1996. "The Economics of Absence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 23-53, March.
    5. Nicholas Wilson & Michael J. Peel, 1991. "The Impact on Absenteeism and Quits of Profit-Sharing and other Forms of Employee Participation," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 44(3), pages 454-468, April.
    6. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    7. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    8. Weiss, Andrew, 1985. "Absenteeism and wages," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 277-279.
    9. Donald R. Winkler, 1980. "The Effects of Sick-Leave Policy on Teacher Absenteeism," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 33(2), pages 232-240, January.
    10. Ronald Ferguson & Randall Filer, 1986. "Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? Absenteeism from Work Among Inner-City Black Youths," NBER Chapters, in: The Black Youth Employment Crisis, pages 261-298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Francis Green & Steven McIntosh, 1998. "Union Power, Cost of Job Loss, and Workers' Effort," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 51(3), pages 363-383, April.
    12. repec:bla:scandj:v:96:y:1994:i:4:p:561-66 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Leigh, J. Paul, 1985. "The effects of unemployment and the business cycle on absenteeism," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 159-170, May.
    14. Kaivanto, Kim, 1997. "An alternative model of pro-cyclical absenteeism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 29-34, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laszlo Goerke & Sabrina Jeworrek, 2021. "Paid vacation use: The role of works councils," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 42(3), pages 473-503, August.
    2. Laszlo Goerke & Sabrina Jeworrek & Markus Pannenberg, 2015. "Trade union membership and paid vacation in Germany," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-26, December.

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