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david cantala, Sr.

Personal Details

First Name:David
Middle Name:
Last Name:Cantala
Suffix:Sr.
RePEc Short-ID:pca721
Terminal Degree:2000 Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics (BSE) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Centro de Estudios Económicos
Colegio de México

México, Mexico
http://cee.colmex.mx/
RePEc:edi:cecolmx (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2014. "Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01109667, HAL.
  2. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2008. "Markovian assignment rules," Working Papers hal-00356304, HAL.
  3. David Cantala, 2002. "Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200201, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Jun 2007.
    repec:hal:pseose:hal-01013737 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. David Cantala & Jaume Sempere, 2015. "Un enfoque de diseño de mercados para la selección de personal del Instituto Nacional Electoral en México," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 30(1), pages 75-92.
  2. David Cantala & Francisco Sánchez, 2008. "Welfare and stability in senior matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 369-392, March.
  3. David Cantalá, 2007. "Preferences for Shifts in Probabilities and Expected Utility Theory," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 22(1), pages 99-109.
  4. David Cantala, 2004. "Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(3), pages 491-514, June.
  5. Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July.
  6. David Cantala, 2004. "Matching Markets: the Particular Case of Couples," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(45), pages 1-11.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2014. "Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01109667, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2014. "Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model," Post-Print halshs-01109667, HAL.

  2. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2008. "Markovian assignment rules," Working Papers hal-00356304, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Economics Working Papers 2015-23, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    2. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2014. "Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model," Post-Print halshs-01109667, HAL.
    3. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    4. Morimitsu Kurino, 2020. "Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 135-165, January.
    5. Xinsheng Xiong & Yong Zhao & Yang Chen, 2017. "A computational approach to the multi-period many-to-one matching with ties," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 183-201, January.
    6. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2017. "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 88-122, February.
    7. Matsui, Akihiko & Murakami, Megumi, 2022. "Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 50-65.
    8. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Thayer Morrill, 2014. "Sequential Kidney Exchange," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 265-285, August.
    9. Samuel Dooley & John P. Dickerson, 2020. "The Affiliate Matching Problem: On Labor Markets where Firms are Also Interested in the Placement of Previous Workers," Papers 2009.11867, arXiv.org.
    10. Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2015. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 74-85.
    11. Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2016. "On the operation of multiple matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 166-185.
    12. Morimitsu Kurino & Yoshinori Kurokawa, 2020. "Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2020-026, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    13. Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Alessandro MARTINELLO, 2018. "Dynamic Refugee Matching," Cahiers de recherche 22-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    14. Francis Bloch & Nicolas Houy, 2012. "Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 13-33, September.
    15. Juan Sebastián Pereyra, 2011. "A dynamic school choice model," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2011-05, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
    16. Morimitsu Kurino, 2014. "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 258-289, February.
    17. Kawasaki, Ryo, 2015. "Roth–Postlewaite stability and von Neumann–Morgenstern stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-6.

  3. David Cantala, 2002. "Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200201, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Jun 2007.

    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Qingyun & Roth, Alvin E., 2018. "The lattice of envy-free matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 201-211.

Articles

  1. David Cantala & Francisco Sánchez, 2008. "Welfare and stability in senior matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 369-392, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2013. "Markovian assignment rules," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01013737, HAL.
    2. Raïssa-Juvette Samba Zitou & Rhonya Adli, 2012. "Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 323-340, March.

  2. David Cantalá, 2007. "Preferences for Shifts in Probabilities and Expected Utility Theory," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 22(1), pages 99-109.

    Cited by:

    1. Karla Flores Zarur & William José Olvera López & Leobardo Plata Pérez, 2023. "A note about the different characterizations of the expected utility theorem/Una nota sobre las diferentes caracterizaciones del teorema de la utilidad esperada," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 38(1), pages 167-181.

  3. David Cantala, 2004. "Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(3), pages 491-514, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha, 2012. "Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 52-67.
    2. Aziz, Haris & Chan, Hau & Lee, Barton E. & Parkes, David C., 2020. "The capacity constrained facility location problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 478-490.
    3. Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2007. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 325, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Edurne Falcó & Madhuparna Karmokar & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2020. "On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 759-776, December.
    5. Kim, Sunyoung & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Chun, Youngsub, 2015. "The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 69-75.
    6. Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2010. "The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 10.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    7. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2012. "The division problem with voluntary participation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 371-406, March.
    8. Jackson, Matthew O. & Nicolo, Antonio, 2002. "The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods Under Congestion and Crowding Preferences," Working Papers 1148, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    9. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2019. "Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 121-142.
    10. Salvador Barberà & Bernardo Moreno, 2010. "Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result," Working Papers 297, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Doghmi Ahmed, 2014. "Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2-4), pages 69-74, July.
    12. Doghmi Ahmed, 2016. "On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 767-795, June.
    13. Doghmi Ahmed, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 35-42, October.
    14. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2012. "Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 490-509.
    15. Haris Aziz & Alexander Lam & Barton E. Lee & Toby Walsh, 2021. "Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location," Papers 2111.01566, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    16. Grisel Ayllón & Diego M. Caramuta, 2016. "Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 245-264, August.

  4. Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Agustín Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2024. "Counting Steps for Re-Stabilization in a Labor Matching Market," Working Papers 328, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    2. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2013. "Markovian assignment rules," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01013737, HAL.
    3. Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Measuring external stability in one-to-one matching," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 234-247.
    4. Elette Boyle & Federico Echenique, 2009. "Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 87-99, June.
    5. David Cantala, 2002. "Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200201, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Jun 2007.
    6. Raïssa-Juvette Samba Zitou & Rhonya Adli, 2012. "Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 323-340, March.
    7. David Cantala, 2011. "Agreement toward stability in matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 293-316, December.
    8. Saglam, Ismail, 2019. "Measuring the External Stability of the One-to-One Matching Generated by the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm," MPRA Paper 91472, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Péter Biró & Katarína Cechlárová & Tamás Fleiner, 2008. "The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 333-352, March.
    10. Kaniska Dam, 2009. "A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Credit Market," Working Papers DTE 461, CIDE, División de Economía.
    11. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
    12. Salgado Alfredo, 2020. "Many-to-one Matching: Externalities and Stability," Working Papers 2020-03, Banco de México.
    13. Mill'an Guerra Beatriz Alejandra, 2022. "The outcome of the restabilization process in matching markets," Papers 2202.12452, arXiv.org.
    14. Yazıcı, Ayşe, 2022. "Decentralized matching at senior-level: Stability and incentives," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    15. Beatriz Millán & Eliana Pepa Risma, 2018. "Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 79-103, June.
    16. Ayse Yazici, 2022. "Decentralized Matching at Senior-Level: Stability and Incentives," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022_01, Durham University, Department of Economics.

  5. David Cantala, 2004. "Matching Markets: the Particular Case of Couples," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(45), pages 1-11.

    Cited by:

    1. Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 637.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    2. Fatma Aslan & Jean Lainé, 2020. "Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples," Post-Print halshs-02613918, HAL.
    3. Peter Biro & Flip Klijn, 2011. "Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1139, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    4. Thanh Nguyen & Rakesh Vohra, 2014. "Near Feasible Stable Matchings with Complementarities," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. Dogan, Onur & Laffond, Gilbert & Lainé, Jean, 2011. "The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 60-67, January.
    6. Perach, Nitsan & Anily, Shoshana, 2022. "Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(1), pages 50-61.
    7. Rouzbeh Ghouchani & Szilvia Pápai, 2020. "Preference Aggregation for Couples," Working Papers 20006, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
    8. Delorme, Maxence & García, Sergio & Gondzio, Jacek & Kalcsics, Joerg & Manlove, David & Pettersson, William, 2021. "Stability in the hospitals/residents problem with couples and ties: Mathematical models and computational studies," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    9. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
    10. Eric J. McDermid & David F. Manlove, 2010. "Keeping partners together: algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 279-303, April.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2009-03-28 2011-01-16
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2014-11-17 2015-06-05
  3. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (2) 2014-11-17 2015-06-05

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