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On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules

Author

Listed:
  • Edurne Falcó

    (Virena Navarra S.L.)

  • Madhuparna Karmokar

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

  • Souvik Roy

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

  • Ton Storcken

    (University of Maastricht)

Abstract

We consider collective evaluation problems, where individual grades given to candidates are combined to obtain a collective grade for each of these candidates. In this paper, we prove the following two results: (1) a collective evaluation rule is update monotone and continuous if and only if it is a min-max rule, and (2) a collective evaluation rule is update monotone and consistent if and only if it is an extreme min-max rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Edurne Falcó & Madhuparna Karmokar & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2020. "On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 759-776, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01263-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01263-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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