IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/dur/durham/2022_01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Decentralized Matching at Senior-Level: Stability and Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Ayse Yazici

    (Department of Economics, University of Durham)

Abstract

We consider senior-level labor markets and study a decentralized game where firms can fire a worker whenever they wish to make an offer to another worker. The game starts with initial matching of firms and workers and proceeds with a random sequence of job offers. The outcome of the game depends on the ran- dom sequence according to which firms make offers and therefore is a probability distribution over the set of matchings. We provide theoretical support for the successful functioning of decentralized matching markets in a setup with myopic workers. We then identify a lower bound on outcomes that are achievable through strategic behavior. We find that in equilibrium either any sequence of offers leads to the same matching or workers (firms) do not agree on what matching is the worst (best) among all possible realizations of the outcome. This implies that workers can always act to avoid a possible realization that they unanimously find undesirable. Hence, a well-known result for centralized matching at the entry- level carries over to matching at the senior-level albeit without the intervention of a mediator.

Suggested Citation

  • Ayse Yazici, 2022. "Decentralized Matching at Senior-Level: Stability and Incentives," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022_01, Durham University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:dur:durham:2022_01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.durham.ac.uk/business/media/durham-university-business-school/about-us/departments/economics-and-finance/working-papers-pdfs/EconWP22_01.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. d’ASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B., 1986. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1986042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," Working Papers 2009-3, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    3. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
    4. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Manea, Mihai, 2019. "Efficient partnership formation in networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
    5. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    6. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    7. Guillaume Haeringer & Myrna Wooders, 2011. "Decentralized job matching," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-28, February.
    8. Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July.
    9. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
    10. Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Mihai Manea, 2019. "Efficient Partnership Formation In Networks," Working Papers 1014, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    11. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1991. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 31-44, January.
    12. Abreu, Dilip & Manea, Mihai, 2012. "Bargaining and efficiency in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 43-70.
    13. Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yazıcı, Ayşe, 2022. "Decentralized matching at senior-level: Stability and incentives," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    2. Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
    4. Günnur Ege Bilgin, 2024. "Decentralized Many-to-One Matching With Random Search," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_541, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    5. Federico Echenique & Leeat Yariv, 2013. "An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching," Working Papers 2013-3, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    6. Yasushi Kawase & Keisuke Bando, 2021. "Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 503-546, June.
    7. B. Evci, 2014. "A new dynamic mechanism to the marriage problem with a variant," Working Papers wp973, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    8. Wu, Qinggong, 2015. "A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 216-242.
    9. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April.
    10. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
    11. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Xue, Licun, 2015. "Decentralized matching: The role of commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 1-17.
    12. Nikhil Agarwal, 2015. "An Empirical Model of the Medical Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 1939-1978, July.
    13. Kushnir, Alexey, 2009. "Matching Markets with Signals," Sustainable Development Papers 50730, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    14. Zhiwei Cui & Yan-An Hwang & Ding-Cheng You, 2021. "Axiomatizations of the $$\beta $$ β and the score measures in networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 399-418, June.
    15. Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2020. "Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 212-239, March.
    16. Guillaume Haeringer & Myrna Wooders, 2011. "Decentralized job matching," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-28, February.
    17. Behnaz Bojd & Hema Yoganarasimhan, 2022. "Star-Cursed Lovers: Role of Popularity Information in Online Dating," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 73-92, January.
    18. Horstschräer, Julia, 2012. "Decentralizing university admission: Evidence from a natural experiment," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-076, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    19. André Veski & Kaire Põder, 2018. "Zero-intelligence agents looking for a job," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 13(3), pages 615-640, October.
    20. Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," Working Papers 2009-3, Princeton University. Economics Department..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Senior-level markets; Stability; Random matching;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dur:durham:2022_01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tatiana Damjanovic (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deduruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.