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Ram Singh

Personal Details

First Name:Ram
Middle Name:
Last Name:Singh
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psi182
http://econdse.org/ramsingh/
Dr. Ram Singh Department of Economics Delhi School of Economics University of Delhi Delhi 110007 INDIA

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics
University of Delhi

Delhi, India
http://www.econdse.org/
RePEc:edi:deudein (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Editorship

Working papers

  1. Allan Feldman & Ram Singh, 2019. "Equilibria under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Working papers 300, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  2. Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018. "On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests," Working papers 288, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  3. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public Private Partnerships Vs. Traditional Roads Project Delivery Time, Costs and Quality," Working papers 290, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  4. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2017. "Takings of Land by Self-interested Governments Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Working papers 281, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  5. Ram Singh, 2016. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria in the Law of Torts: An Enquiry into the Doctrine of Causation," Working Papers id:11237, eSocialSciences.
  6. Ram Singh, 2012. "Inefficiency And Abuse Of Compulsory Land Acquisition--An Enquiry Into The Way Forward," Working papers 209, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  7. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
  8. Ram Singh, 2009. "Cost and Time Overruns in Infrastructure Projects: Extent, Causes and Remedies," Working Papers id:2281, eSocialSciences.
  9. Ram Singh, 2009. "Delays and Cost Overruns in Infrastructure Projects -- An Enquiry into Extents, Causes and Remedies," Working papers 181, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  10. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  11. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance," Working papers 173, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  12. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  13. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  14. Ram Singh, 2005. "Comparative Causation -- A Re-examination," Working papers 139, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  15. Ram Singh, 2002. "Characterization of Efficient Product Liability Rules: When Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 110, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  16. Ram Singh, 2002. "Causation, Economic Efficiency and the Law of Torts," Working papers 102, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  17. Ram Singh, 2001. "Effects of Courts' Errors on Efficiency of Liability Rules: When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 97, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  18. Ram Singh, 2001. "Efficient Liability Rules When Courts Make Errors in Estimation of the Harm : Complete Characterization," Working papers 99, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

Articles

  1. Ram Singh, 2019. "Kaushik Basu: The republic of beliefs: A new approach to law and economics," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 371-380, December.
  2. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public–private partnerships vs. traditional contracts for highways," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 29-63, December.
  3. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2018. "Takings of Land by Self-Interested Governments: Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(3), pages 427-459.
  4. Feldman Allan M. & Singh Ram, 2011. "A Simple Guide to Comparative Vigilance," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-24, October.
  5. Singh, Ram, 2011. "Determinants of Cost Overruns in Public Procurement of Infrastructure: Roads and Railways," India Policy Forum, National Council of Applied Economic Research, vol. 7(1), pages 97-158.
  6. Parisi Francesco & Singh Ram, 2010. "The Efficiency of Comparative Causation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 219-245, September.
  7. Ram Singh, 2009. "RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, February.
  8. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
  9. Singh Ram, 2007. "Comparative Causation and Economic Efficiency: When Activity Levels are Constant," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 383-406, December.
  10. Singh, Ram, 2007. "‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 179-203.
  11. Ram Singh, 2007. "Book Review: Markets and Governments," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 270-272, July.
  12. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September.
  13. Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July.
  14. Satish K. Jain & Ram Singh, 2002. "Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 105-124, March.
  15. Ram Singh & Sukhjit Singh, 2000. "Subordination by convex functions," International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences, Hindawi, vol. 24, pages 1-6, January.
  16. Birthal, Pratap Singh & Singh, R. P., 1991. "Land-Lease Market, Resource Adjustment and Agricultural Development," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 46(3), July.

Editorship

  1. Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Allan Feldman & Ram Singh, 2019. "Equilibria under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Working papers 300, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    2. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

  2. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public Private Partnerships Vs. Traditional Roads Project Delivery Time, Costs and Quality," Working papers 290, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 13406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Gharad Bryan & Edward Glaeser & Nick Tsivanidis, 2019. "Cities in the Developing World," NBER Working Papers 26390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  3. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2017. "Takings of Land by Self-interested Governments Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Working papers 281, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ram Singh, 2019. "Kaushik Basu: The republic of beliefs: A new approach to law and economics," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 371-380, December.

  4. Ram Singh, 2012. "Inefficiency And Abuse Of Compulsory Land Acquisition--An Enquiry Into The Way Forward," Working papers 209, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Patil, Vikram & Ghosh, Ranjan & Kathuria, Vinish & Farrell, Katharine N., 2020. "Money, Land or self-employment? Understanding preference heterogeneity in landowners’ choices for compensation under land acquisition in India," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    2. Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Andrei Shleifer, 2016. "Securing Property Rights," Working Paper 463441, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    3. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2018. "Takings of Land by Self-Interested Governments: Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(3), pages 427-459.
    4. Vikram Patil & Ranjan Ghosh, 2017. "Rehabilitation Myths? How Transaction Costs Reduce Farmer Welfare After Land Acquisition," Journal of South Asian Development, , vol. 12(1), pages 1-17, April.
    5. Cheng, Mingda & Du, Julan & Ye, Chunhui & Zhang, Qi, 2022. "Your misfortune is also mine: Land expropriation, property rights insecurity, and household behaviors in rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 1068-1086.
    6. Jyoti Shukla & Piyush Tiwari, 2022. "Measuring Inadequacy in Compensation for the Compulsory Acquisition of Land: Evidence from Bengaluru, India," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-16, April.
    7. Sreeparna Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Jaideep Roy & Prasad Bhattarcharya, 2016. "Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Holdout," Discussion Papers 16-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    8. Ram Singh, 2022. "Do the Wealthy Underreport their Income? Analysing Relationship between Wealth and Reported Income in India," Working papers 331, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    9. Nandwani, Bharti, 2022. "Community forestry and its implications for land related disputes: Evidence from India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    10. Nitika Dhingra, 2022. "Political economy of law, efficiency and adverse ‘inclusion’: rethinking land acquisition in India," Review of Evolutionary Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 379-403, July.
    11. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public Private Partnerships Vs. Traditional Roads Project Delivery Time, Costs and Quality," Working papers 290, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    12. Tran Tuan Nguyen, 2021. "Shrinking agricultural land and changing livelihoods after land acquisition in Vietnam," Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series, Sciendo, vol. 53(53), pages 17-32, September.
    13. Schäfer Hans-Bernd, 2019. "Rules versus Standards in Developing Countries: the Case for Clear and Precise Legal Norms on Eminent Domain Power," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 425-455, June.
    14. Soumendu Sarkar, 2017. "Mechanism design for land acquisition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 783-812, August.

  5. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.

    Cited by:

    1. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    2. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe & Hendriks Eva S., 2013. "Relative Fault and Efficient Negligence: Comparative Negligence Explained," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-40, June.
    3. DEHEZ, Pierre & FEREY, Samuel, 2012. "How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2012023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Emanuela Carbonara & Alice Guerra & Francesco Parisi, 2016. "Sharing Residual Liability: The Cheapest Cost Avoider Revisited," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 173-201.
    5. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2014. "Loss-sharing between Nonnegligent Parties," Working Papers of BETA 2014-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Lando, Henrik & Schweizer, Urs, 2021. "Causation and the incentives of multiple injurers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    7. Acciarri Hugo A. & Tohmé Fernando & Castellano Andrea, 2016. "Causal Apportionment of Tort Liability: An Efficient Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 37-55, March.
    8. Samuel Ferey & Pierre Dehez, 2016. "Multiple Causation, Apportionment, and the Shapley Value," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 143-171.
    9. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2023. "Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 229-258, January.
    10. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    11. Diego M. Papayannis, 2016. "El derecho privado como cuestión pública. Serie de Teoría Jurídica y Filosofía del Derecho N.º 75," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 818, htpr_v3_i.
    12. Jain Satish K. & Kundu Rajendra P., 2015. "Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficiency of Liability Rules," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 453-480, November.

  6. Ram Singh, 2009. "Cost and Time Overruns in Infrastructure Projects: Extent, Causes and Remedies," Working Papers id:2281, eSocialSciences.

    Cited by:

    1. Nandita Vadali & Anand Prakash Tiwari & Thillai Rajan A., 2014. "Effect of the Political Environment on Public Private Partnership Projects," Journal of Infrastructure Development, India Development Foundation, vol. 6(2), pages 145-165, December.
    2. Gunilla Öberg & Geneviève S. Metson & Yusuke Kuwayama & Steven A. Conrad, 2020. "Conventional Sewer Systems Are Too Time-Consuming, Costly and Inflexible to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(16), pages 1-17, August.
    3. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public Private Partnerships Vs. Traditional Roads Project Delivery Time, Costs and Quality," Working papers 290, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    4. Miranda Sarmento, J.J., 2014. "Public private partnerships," Other publications TiSEM c7d4c978-234c-4f88-83ed-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public–private partnerships vs. traditional contracts for highways," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 29-63, December.
    6. Steininger, Bertram & Groth, Martin & Weber, Birgitte, 2020. "Cost overruns and delays in infrastructure projects: the case of Stuttgart 21," Working Paper Series 20/11, Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Banking and Finance.

  7. Ram Singh, 2009. "Delays and Cost Overruns in Infrastructure Projects -- An Enquiry into Extents, Causes and Remedies," Working papers 181, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ihsan Issa Ahmad Hosani & Fikri T. Dweiri & Udechukwu Ojiako, 0. "A study of cost overruns in complex multi-stakeholder road projects in the United Arab Emirates," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 0, pages 1-10.
    2. Lundberg, Mattias & Jenpanitsub, Anchalee & Pyddoke, Roger, 2011. "Cost overruns in Swedish transport projects," Working papers in Transport Economics 2011:11, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    3. Ihsan Issa Ahmad Hosani & Fikri T. Dweiri & Udechukwu Ojiako, 2020. "A study of cost overruns in complex multi-stakeholder road projects in the United Arab Emirates," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 11(6), pages 1250-1259, December.
    4. Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2012. "Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages," Working Papers 2012.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Santanu Chatterjee & Olaf Posch & Dennis Wesselbaum, 2017. "Delays in Public Goods," Working Papers 1702, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2017.
    6. Molinari, Laura & Haezendonck, Elvira & Mabillard, Vincent, 2023. "Cost overruns of Belgian transport infrastructure projects: Analyzing variations over three land transport modes and two project phases," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 167-179.
    7. Shenzhe Jiang & Junjie Xia & Jiajun Xu & Jianye Yan, 2023. "A theory of National Development Bank: long-term investment and the agency problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(3), pages 995-1024, October.
    8. James Odeck, 2019. "Variation in cost overruns of transportation projects: an econometric meta-regression analysis of studies reported in the literature," Transportation, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 1345-1368, August.

  8. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance," Working papers 173, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
    2. Jesko Schulte & Henrik Ny, 2018. "Electric Road Systems: Strategic Stepping Stone on the Way towards Sustainable Freight Transport?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-16, April.
    3. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    4. Ram Singh, 2019. "Kaushik Basu: The republic of beliefs: A new approach to law and economics," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 371-380, December.
    5. Kundu, Rajendra P. & Kaur, Harshil, 2022. "Efficient simple liability assignment rules: A complete characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 22-31.
    6. Lando, Henrik & Schweizer, Urs, 2021. "Causation and the incentives of multiple injurers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    7. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    8. Samuel Ferey & Pierre Dehez, 2016. "Multiple Causation, Apportionment, and the Shapley Value," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 143-171.
    9. Ram Singh & Allan M. Feldman, 2010. "Comparative Vigilance," Working Papers id:2682, eSocialSciences.

  9. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    2. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim & Rasch, Alexander, 2016. "Why product liability may lower product safety," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 55-58.
    3. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

  10. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
    2. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    3. Emanuela Carbonara & Alice Guerra & Francesco Parisi, 2016. "Sharing Residual Liability: The Cheapest Cost Avoider Revisited," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 173-201.
    4. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    5. Feldman Allan M. & Singh Ram, 2011. "A Simple Guide to Comparative Vigilance," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-24, October.
    6. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    7. Ram Singh & Allan M. Feldman, 2010. "Comparative Vigilance," Working Papers id:2682, eSocialSciences.

  11. Ram Singh, 2002. "Causation, Economic Efficiency and the Law of Torts," Working papers 102, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Acciarri Hugo A. & Tohmé Fernando & Castellano Andrea, 2016. "Causal Apportionment of Tort Liability: An Efficient Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 37-55, March.

Articles

  1. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public–private partnerships vs. traditional contracts for highways," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 29-63, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers 13406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Gharad Bryan & Edward Glaeser & Nick Tsivanidis, 2019. "Cities in the Developing World," NBER Working Papers 26390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  2. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2018. "Takings of Land by Self-Interested Governments: Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(3), pages 427-459.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Singh, Ram, 2011. "Determinants of Cost Overruns in Public Procurement of Infrastructure: Roads and Railways," India Policy Forum, National Council of Applied Economic Research, vol. 7(1), pages 97-158.

    Cited by:

    1. Silaghi, Florina & Sarkar, Sudipto, 2021. "Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(3), pages 1174-1191.
    2. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public Private Partnerships Vs. Traditional Roads Project Delivery Time, Costs and Quality," Working papers 290, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    3. Temitope Seun Omotayo & Bankole Awuzie & Valerie Kenechukwu Obi & Saheed Ajayi & Lovelin Ifeoma Obi & Oluyomi Osobajo & Adekunle Oke, 2022. "The System Dynamics Analysis of Cost Overrun Causations in UK Rail Projects in a COVID-19 Epidemic Era," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(2), pages 21582440221, May.
    4. Ram Singh, 2018. "Public–private partnerships vs. traditional contracts for highways," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 29-63, December.

  4. Parisi Francesco & Singh Ram, 2010. "The Efficiency of Comparative Causation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 219-245, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Ram Singh, 2009. "RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Singh Ram, 2007. "Comparative Causation and Economic Efficiency: When Activity Levels are Constant," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 383-406, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
    2. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    3. Ram Singh, 2019. "Kaushik Basu: The republic of beliefs: A new approach to law and economics," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 371-380, December.
    4. Ram Singh, 2008. "On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," Working Papers id:1716, eSocialSciences.
    5. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2014. "Loss-sharing between Nonnegligent Parties," Working Papers of BETA 2014-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Qi Zhou, 2009. "Economic analysis of the legal standard for deceit in English tort law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 83-102, August.
    7. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    8. Jain Satish K. & Kundu Rajendra P., 2015. "Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficiency of Liability Rules," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 453-480, November.

  8. Singh, Ram, 2007. "‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 179-203.

    Cited by:

    1. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
    2. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September.
    3. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    4. Ram Singh, 2008. "On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," Working Papers id:1716, eSocialSciences.
    5. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    6. Samuel Ferey & Pierre Dehez, 2016. "Multiple Causation, Apportionment, and the Shapley Value," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 143-171.
    7. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    8. Ram Singh & Allan M. Feldman, 2010. "Comparative Vigilance," Working Papers id:2682, eSocialSciences.

  9. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    2. Leif Danziger & Eliakim Katz, 2019. "Compensation in Personal Injury Cases: Mean or Median Income?," CESifo Working Paper Series 7748, CESifo.
    3. Kundu, Rajendra P. & Kaur, Harshil, 2022. "Efficient simple liability assignment rules: A complete characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 22-31.
    4. Lando, Henrik & Schweizer, Urs, 2021. "Causation and the incentives of multiple injurers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    5. Leif Danziger & Eliakim Katz, 2019. "Compensation in personal injury cases: mean or median income?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 291-303, October.
    6. Danziger, Leif & Katz, Eliakim, 2019. "Compensation in Personal Injury Cases: Mean or Median Income?," IZA Discussion Papers 12466, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

  10. Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
    2. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September.
    3. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability: An Enquiry into Conflicting Objectives," Working Papers id:1466, eSocialSciences.
    4. Ram Singh, 2016. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria in the Law of Torts: An Enquiry into the Doctrine of Causation," Working Papers id:11237, eSocialSciences.
    5. Tim Friehe, 2007. "On the incentive effects of damage averaging in tort law," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7.

  11. Satish K. Jain & Ram Singh, 2002. "Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 105-124, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
    2. Feldman Allan & Singh Ram, 2021. "Equilibria Under Negligence Liability: How the Standard Claims Fall Apart," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, March.
    3. Schweizer, Urs, 2005. "Law and Economics of Obligations," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 209-228, June.
    4. Ram Singh, 2002. "Causation, Economic Efficiency and the Law of Torts," Working papers 102, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    5. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe & Hendriks Eva S., 2013. "Relative Fault and Efficient Negligence: Comparative Negligence Explained," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-40, June.
    6. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability: An Enquiry into Conflicting Objectives," Working Papers id:1466, eSocialSciences.
    7. Kundu, Rajendra P. & Kaur, Harshil, 2022. "Efficient simple liability assignment rules: A complete characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 22-31.
    8. Ram Singh, 2008. "On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," Working Papers id:1716, eSocialSciences.
    9. Satish K. Jain & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2004. "Economic Efficiency, Distributive Justice and Liability Rules," Working papers 130, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    10. Ram Singh, 2005. "Comparative Causation -- A Re-examination," Working papers 139, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    11. Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July.
    12. Satish K. Jain, 2009. "Efficiency Of Liability Rules With Multiple Victims," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 119-134, February.
    13. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2014. "Loss-sharing between Nonnegligent Parties," Working Papers of BETA 2014-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    14. Jain, Satish K. & Kundu, Rajendra P., 2006. "Characterization of efficient simple liability rules with multiple tortfeasors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 410-427, September.
    15. Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2023. "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligence rules," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 119-140, June.
    16. Ram Singh, 2016. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria in the Law of Torts: An Enquiry into the Doctrine of Causation," Working Papers id:11237, eSocialSciences.
    17. Kim, Jeonghyun & Feldman, Allan M., 2006. "Victim or injurer, small car or SUV: Tort liability rules under role-type uncertainty," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 455-477, December.
    18. Jain Satish K., 2009. "The Structure of Incremental Liability Rules," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 373-398, June.
    19. Ram Singh, 2008. "Efficient Liability Rules When Courts Make Errors in Estimation of the Harm: Complet Characterization," Working Papers id:1612, eSocialSciences.
    20. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    21. Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kunda, 2021. "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligencerules," Working Papers 2157, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade.
    22. Ram Singh, 2002. "Characterization of Efficient Product Liability Rules: When Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 110, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    23. Satish Jain, 2006. "Efficiency of liability rules: A reconsideration," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 359-373.
    24. Schweizer, Urs, 2004. "Law and Economics of Obligations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 2/2004, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    25. Rajendra P. Kundu, 2009. "Efficiency Of Liability Rules With Interdependent Costs Of Care," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 71-88, February.
    26. Jain, Satish, 2010. "Market, Democracy, and Diversity of Individual Preferences," Working Papers 7, JICA Research Institute.
    27. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    28. Jain Satish K., 2012. "Decoupled Liability and Efficiency: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 697-718, December.
    29. Jain Satish K. & Kundu Rajendra P., 2015. "Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficiency of Liability Rules," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 453-480, November.
    30. Singh, Ram, 2007. "‘Causation-consistent’ liability, economic efficiency and the law of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 179-203.
    31. Ram Singh & Allan M. Feldman, 2010. "Comparative Vigilance," Working Papers id:2682, eSocialSciences.
    32. González, Patrick, 2003. "Optimal Assignment of Liabilities," Cahiers de recherche 0305, GREEN.
    33. Harshil Kaur & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2020. "Efficient Liability Assignment: Is Coupling a Necessity?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(3), pages 2388-2394.
    34. Jain, Satish, 2023. "Successive Joint Torts: Conditions for Efficiency," MPRA Paper 118440, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    35. Jeonghyun Kim, 2013. "Revisiting the Learned Hand Formula and Economic Analysis of Negligence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 407-432, September.
    36. Srivastava Astha & Srivastava Ankur, 2021. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law: A New Liability Rule that Induces Socially Optimal Behaviour in Case of Limited Information," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 119-131, March.

  12. Birthal, Pratap Singh & Singh, R. P., 1991. "Land-Lease Market, Resource Adjustment and Agricultural Development," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 46(3), July.

    Cited by:

    1. Platteau, J.P., 1994. "A Framework for the Analysis of Evolving Patron-Client Ties In Agrarian Economies," Papers 140, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
    2. Lastarria-Cornhiel, Susana & Melmed-Sanjak, Jolyne, 1999. "Land Tenancy In Asia, Africa, And Latin America: A Look At The Past And A View To The Future," Working Papers 12783, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Land Tenure Center.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 14 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (5) 2003-06-04 2003-07-10 2003-07-10 2006-11-04 2009-07-17. Author is listed
  2. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (3) 2009-11-21 2010-05-02 2018-10-08
  3. NEP-CWA: Central and Western Asia (2) 2009-11-21 2010-05-02
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2009-07-17 2018-07-23
  5. NEP-REG: Regulation (2) 2005-11-05 2012-02-01
  6. NEP-AGR: Agricultural Economics (1) 2012-02-01
  7. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2009-11-21
  8. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2018-07-23
  9. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2010-09-25
  10. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (1) 2008-02-23
  11. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2009-07-17
  12. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2009-11-21
  13. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (1) 2018-10-08
  14. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (1) 2018-10-08

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