IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v25y2005i2p209-228.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Law and Economics of Obligations

Author

Listed:
  • Schweizer, Urs

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Schweizer, Urs, 2005. "Law and Economics of Obligations," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 209-228, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:209-228
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144-8188(05)00034-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 39-53, Spring.
    2. Steven Shavell, 1980. "Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 466-490, Autumn.
    3. Satish K. Jain & Ram Singh, 2002. "Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 105-124, March.
    4. Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-447, June.
    5. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nyberg, Sten & Priks, Mikael, 2017. "Public order and private payments: Evidence from the Swedish soccer league," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 1-8.
    2. Schweizer, Urs, 2007. "Tortious acts affecting markets," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 49-69, March.
    3. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Legal Damages at Uncertain Causation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 160, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Tortious Acts Affecting Markets," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 106, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    5. Marie‐Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Liability insurance under the negligence rule," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 486-508, September.
    6. Schweizer, Urs, 2016. "Efficient incentives from obligation law and the compensation principle," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 54-62.
    7. Fluet, Claude, 2010. "Liability rules under evidentiary uncertainty," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-9, March.
    8. Schweizer, Urs, 2009. "Legal damages for losses of chances," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 153-160, June.
    9. Pablo Salvador-Coderch & Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez-Ligüerre, 2009. "Scope of liability: the vanishing distinction between negligence and strict liability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 257-287, December.
    10. Schweizer, Urs, 2008. "Legal Damages for Losses of Chances," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 235, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    11. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Reliance Investments, Expectation Damages and Hidden Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 162, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schweizer, Urs, 2004. "Law and Economics of Obligations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 2/2004, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    2. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014. "Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
    3. Susanne Ohlendorf, 2009. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1608-1618, September.
    4. Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Post-Print halshs-03704424, HAL.
    5. Brooks, Richard & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "On and Off Contract Remedies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 290, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 337-359.
    7. Alessandro De Chiara, 2018. "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers 2018_5, Department of Economics, Central European University.
    8. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2014. "Opportunism in Sequential Investment Settings: On Holdups and Holdouts," Working papers 2014-08, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    9. Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 14(2), pages 488-516.
    10. Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2012. "Contracts between Legal Persons [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    11. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, 2020. "Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 33-72.
    12. Simon Schropp, Kornel Mahlstein, 2007. "The Optimal Design of Trade Policy Flexibility in the WTO," IHEID Working Papers 27-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Dec 2007.
    13. Charles North, 2001. "Remedies for misrepresentation in applications in the presence of fraudulent intent," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(2), pages 162-176, June.
    14. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Including Hybrid Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 282, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    15. Schweizer, Urs, 2004. "Cooperative Investments Induced by Contract Law," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 10, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    16. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2009. "Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2193-2208, December.
    17. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
    18. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, 2007. "Implications of Breach Remedy and Renegotiation Design for Innovation and Capacity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(12), pages 1859-1871, December.
    19. Seshimo, Hiroyuki, 2003. "Optimal tenant protection," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 59-92, January.
    20. Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Transaction-Specific Investments and Organizational Choice: A Coase-to-Coase Theory," Working papers 2014-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:209-228. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.