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Efficient Liability Assignment: Is Coupling a Necessity?

Author

Listed:
  • Harshil Kaur

    (College of Vocational Studies, University of Delhi)

  • Rajendra P. Kundu

    (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Abstract

The authors would like to thank Debabrata Pal, Papiya Ghosh, Siddhi Gyan Pandey, Taposik Banerjee and participants of National Conference on Economic Theory and Policy, organized by School of Liberal Studies, Ambedkar University Delhi, 9-10 March 2018 and Conference on Law and Economics: Theoretical & Empirical Explorations, organized by NALSAR Hyderabad, 19-20 January 2019 for helpful comments and suggestions.

Suggested Citation

  • Harshil Kaur & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2020. "Efficient Liability Assignment: Is Coupling a Necessity?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(3), pages 2388-2394.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-20-00011
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2020/Volume40/EB-20-V40-I3-P208.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Satish Kumar Jain, 2015. "Economic Analysis of Liability Rules," Springer Books, Springer, edition 127, number 978-81-322-2029-9, June.
    2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
    5. Shavell, Steven, 2007. "Liability for Accidents," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 139-182, Elsevier.
    6. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    7. Jain Satish K., 2012. "Decoupled Liability and Efficiency: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 697-718, December.
    8. Peter A. Diamond, 1974. "Accident Law and Resource Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 366-405, Autumn.
    9. Satish K. Jain & Ram Singh, 2002. "Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 105-124, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kunda, 2021. "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligencerules," Working Papers 2157, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade.
    2. Kundu, Rajendra P. & Kaur, Harshil, 2022. "Efficient simple liability assignment rules: A complete characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 22-31.
    3. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2021. "Equilibria under Liability Rules: How the standard claims fall apart," Working papers 315, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    4. Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2023. "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligence rules," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 119-140, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Liability assignment rule; efficiency; Nash equilibrium; decoupling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law

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