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Shingo Ishiguro

Personal Details

First Name:Shingo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ishiguro
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pis96
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https://sites.google.com/view/ishiguro/

Affiliation

Graduate School of Economics
Osaka University

Osaka, Japan
http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
RePEc:edi:feosujp (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Shingo Ishiguro & Yosuke Yasuda, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Target Budgets," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-03, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Shingo Ishiguro, 2016. "Macroeconomic Dynamics with Limited Commitment in Financial and Labor Contracts," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 16-25, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Shingo Ishiguro, 2011. "Relationships and Growth," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Shingo Ishiguro, 2011. "Fair Contracts," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-30, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  7. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Organizational Dynamics," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-14, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  8. Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2004. "Raising Wages to Deter Entry under Unionization," Discussion Paper Series 155, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  9. Shingo Ishiguro, 2004. "Information Aggregation and Efficiency in Agency Contracts with Endogenous Externality," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 60, Econometric Society.
  10. Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H., 1998. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents," ISER Discussion Paper 0471, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  11. Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H., 1996. "Moral Hazard and Size Trade in Agency Contracts," ISER Discussion Paper 0422, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

Articles

  1. Shingo Ishiguro, 2016. "Relationships and Growth: On the Dynamic Interplay between Relational Contracts and Competitive Markets in Economic Development," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 629-657.
  2. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2012. "On the Optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 486-517, August.
  3. Shingo Ishiguro, 2010. "Holdup, search, and inefficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 307-338, August.
  4. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2010. "Contracts, search, and organizational diversity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 678-691, July.
  5. Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2009. "Raising Wages To Deter Entry Into Unionized Markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 435-445, December.
  6. Koichi Futagami & Shingo Ishiguro, 2004. "Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 129-146, July.
  7. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2004. "Collusion and discrimination in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 357-369, June.
  8. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2003. "Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase Theorem revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 67-71, July.
  9. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2002. "Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 518-530, August.
  10. Shingo Ishiguro, 2002. "Optimal Incentives for Teams: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1711-1711, December.
  11. Shingo Ishiguro & Hideshi Itoh, 2001. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 1-20.
  12. Shingo Ishiguro, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Breach Remedies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(2), pages 342-342, June.
  13. Shingo Ishiguro & Yoshimasa Shirai, 1998. "Entry Deterrence in a Unionized Oligopoly," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 210-221, June.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Choe Chongwoo & Park In-Uck, 2011. "Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-39, February.

  2. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Nicita & Simone Sepe, 2012. "Incomplete contracts and competition: another look at fisher body/general motors?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 495-514, December.
    2. Antonio Nicita & Massimiliano Vatiero, 2014. "Dixit versus Williamson: the ‘fundamental transformation’ reconsidered," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 439-453, June.
    3. Antonio Nicita, 2013. "Managing Strategically Outside Options under Incomplete Contracts," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 361-374, September.

  3. Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2004. "Raising Wages to Deter Entry under Unionization," Discussion Paper Series 155, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco de Pinto & Laszlo Goerke, 2019. "Welfare-enhancing trade unions in an oligopoly with excessive entry," CESifo Working Paper Series 7668, CESifo.
    2. Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2009. "Raising Wages To Deter Entry Into Unionized Markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 435-445, December.

  4. Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H., 1998. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents," ISER Discussion Paper 0471, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Osano & Mami Kobayashi, 2003. "Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation," KIER Working Papers 563, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Fosco, C. & Mengel, F., 2008. "Incentives and informal networks," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    4. Shingo Ishiguro, 2004. "Information Aggregation and Efficiency in Agency Contracts with Endogenous Externality," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 60, Econometric Society.
    5. Chrisman, James J. & Chua, Jess H. & Kellermanns, Franz W. & Chang, Erick P.C., 2007. "Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(10), pages 1030-1038, October.
    6. Bin R. Chen & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2013. "Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 665-698, June.
    7. Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers 23-1421, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2024.
    8. G. Bono, 2005. "Monitoring Team Production by Design," Working Papers 540, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

  5. Ishiguro, S. & Itoh, H., 1996. "Moral Hazard and Size Trade in Agency Contracts," ISER Discussion Paper 0422, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    Cited by:

    1. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2004. "Collusion and discrimination in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 357-369, June.

Articles

  1. Shingo Ishiguro, 2016. "Relationships and Growth: On the Dynamic Interplay between Relational Contracts and Competitive Markets in Economic Development," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 629-657.

    Cited by:

    1. Nakabayashi, Masaki, 2019. "From family security to the welfare state: Path dependency of social security on the difference in legal origins," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 280-293.
    2. Xie, Dongshui & Bai, Caiquan & Zhang, Yuwei, 2023. "Relation-based governance, financial crisis shock, and economic growth in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    3. Dongshui Xie & Caiquan Bai & Weiwei Xiao, 2022. "Institutional environment, development model transformation and North–South economic disparity in China," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 1877-1906, December.

  2. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2012. "On the Optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 486-517, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Michael Beckmann & Thomas Cornelissen & Matthias Kräkel, 2015. "Self-Managed Working Time and Employee Effort: Theory and Evidence," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 768, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    2. Matthias Kräkel, 2017. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
    3. Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "Hierarchies Versus Committees: Communication and Information Acquisition in Organizations," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 62-88, March.
    4. Choe Chongwoo & Park In-Uck, 2011. "Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-39, February.
    5. Kräkel, Matthias, 2018. "Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation," IZA Discussion Papers 11289, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2022. "Relational Contracts and Hierarchy," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    7. Kiyotaki, Fumi & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2012. "The choice of organizational form under intrafirm bargaining rules," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 369-392.
    8. Pandher, Gurupdesh S. & Vu, Joseph D., 2018. "Divisional managers' compensation to maximize spillovers and cooperation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 44-54.

  3. Shingo Ishiguro, 2010. "Holdup, search, and inefficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 307-338, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2010. "Contracts, search, and organizational diversity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 678-691, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Huanlang He & Zhihao Yu, 2015. "The evolving patterns of global production of multi-product firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(3), pages 1175-1194, August.

  5. Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2009. "Raising Wages To Deter Entry Into Unionized Markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 435-445, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco de Pinto & Laszlo Goerke, 2019. "Welfare-enhancing trade unions in an oligopoly with excessive entry," CESifo Working Paper Series 7668, CESifo.
    2. Ronald Bachmann & Thomas K. Bauer & Hanna Frings, 2014. "Minimum Wages as a Barrier to Entry: Evidence from Germany," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 28(3), pages 338-357, September.

  6. Koichi Futagami & Shingo Ishiguro, 2004. "Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 129-146, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Masashi Tanaka, 2020. "Human capital investment, credentialing, and wage differentials," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(4), pages 992-1016, August.
    2. Takaaki Morimoto, 2018. "Occupational choice and entrepreneurship: effects of R&D subsidies on economic growth," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(2), pages 161-185, March.
    3. Guha Brishti & Guha Ashok S, 2008. "Target Saving in an Overlapping Generations Model," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-26, March.
    4. Masashi Tanaka, 2013. "Human capital investment, Signaling, and Wage differentials," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    5. Bergh, Andreas & Fink, Günther, 2005. "Escaping Mass Education – Why Harvard Pays," Working Papers 2005:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    6. Pei-Ju Liao & Ping Wang & Yin-Chi Wang & Chong Kee Yip, 2017. "Educational Choice, Rural-urban Migration and Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 23939, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Masashi Tanaka, 2013. "Human Capital Investment, Credentialing, and Wage Differentials," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-31-Rev., Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Aug 2017.

  7. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2004. "Collusion and discrimination in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 357-369, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
    2. Oliver Gürtler, 2010. "Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 100(3), pages 265-280, July.
    3. Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(3), pages 627-655.
    4. S. Leitner & D.A. Behrens, 2015. "On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms," Mathematical and Computer Modelling of Dynamical Systems, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(5), pages 413-431, September.
    5. Dahai Li & Huan Wang & Yang Li, 2023. "Incentive Mechanisms for Thermal Power Generation Enterprises with Conflicting Tasks: Electricity Production versus Carbon Emission Reduction," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-22, July.
    6. Jonathan Glover & Eunhee Kim, 2021. "Optimal Team Composition: Diversity to Foster Implicit Team Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5800-5820, September.
    7. Gilpatric, Scott M. & Vossler, Christian A. & Liu, Lirong, 2015. "Using competition to stimulate regulatory compliance: A tournament-based dynamic targeting mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 182-196.
    8. Chen, Zhijun, 2006. "Fighting Collusion in Tournaments," MPRA Paper 872, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2010. "Technology choice, relative performance pay, and worker heterogeneity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 748-758, December.
    10. Alice Peng-Ju Su, 2019. "Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 687-712, June.
    11. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2010. "Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 10/2010, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).

  8. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2003. "Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase Theorem revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 67-71, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Bingham, Logan Robert, 2021. "Vittel as a model case in PES discourse: Review and critical perspective," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    2. Jaza Folefack, Achille Jean & Darr, Dietrich, 2021. "Promoting cocoa agroforestry under conditions of separated ownership of land and trees: Strengthening customary tenure institutions in Cameroon," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).

  9. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2002. "Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 518-530, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2004. "Endogenous Verifiability in Relational Contracting," Discussion Papers 2004/20, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    2. Miyazawa, Shinjiro, 2012. "Optimal borrowing structure: An explanation for the multiplicity of large-share creditors and the differentiation among them," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 434-453.
    3. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
    4. Hideshi Itoh, 2023. "What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 333-354, July.
    5. Matthias Kräkel, 2010. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages, and Litigation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 337-364.
    6. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2015. "The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-39.
    7. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond, 2012. "Incentive provision when contracting is costly," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2012/16, University of Stavanger.
    8. Manuel Willington & Roy Costilla, 2007. "Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency: A non-contingent approach," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv189, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.

  10. Shingo Ishiguro, 2002. "Optimal Incentives for Teams: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1711-1711, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Alice Peng-Ju Su, 2019. "Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 687-712, June.
    2. Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers 23-1421, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2024.

  11. Shingo Ishiguro & Hideshi Itoh, 2001. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 1-20.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  12. Shingo Ishiguro, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Breach Remedies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(2), pages 342-342, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
    2. Arshad Ali Javed & Patrick T.I. Lam & Albert P.C. Chan, 2014. "Change negotiation in public-private partnership projects through output specifications: an experimental approach based on game theory," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 323-348, April.

  13. Shingo Ishiguro & Yoshimasa Shirai, 1998. "Entry Deterrence in a Unionized Oligopoly," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 210-221, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Minas Vlassis & Stefanos Mamakis, 2014. "Optimal Strategies in Unionized Oligopoly and Inward FDI," Working Papers 1402, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    2. Kyota Eguchi, 2000. "Unions, Job Security, and Incentives of Workers," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-91, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry threats and insufficiency in efficient bargaining," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2010-016, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    4. Minas Vlassis & Stefanos Mamakis, 2014. "Union Structure and Inward FDI Focusing on Reservation Wage Factor Analysis," Working Papers 1403, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    5. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2016. "Bargaining Agenda and Entry in a Unionised Model with Network Effects," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 2(1), pages 91-121, March.
    6. Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2004. "Raising Wages to Deter Entry under Unionization," Discussion Paper Series 155, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    7. Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2009. "Raising Wages To Deter Entry Into Unionized Markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 435-445, December.
    8. Rupayan Pal, 2008. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence:A Reassessment of Limit Pricing," Working Papers id:1375, eSocialSciences.
    9. Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry Threats, and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’," Labor Economics Working Papers 23020, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    10. Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’," Working Papers id:2833, eSocialSciences.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (4) 2007-04-28 2009-02-22 2009-07-17 2011-11-28
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2007-04-28 2009-02-22 2009-07-17 2011-11-28
  3. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (3) 2007-04-28 2011-11-28 2016-10-23
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2011-11-28 2011-11-28 2018-02-12
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2011-11-28 2018-02-12
  6. NEP-CWA: Central and Western Asia (1) 2011-11-28
  7. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2011-11-28
  8. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2018-02-12
  9. NEP-IUE: Informal and Underground Economics (1) 2016-10-23
  10. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2016-10-23
  11. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2007-04-28

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