Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes
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- Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2010. "Technology Choice, Relative Performance Pay, and Worker Heterogeneity," Post-Print hal-00911828, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
complementarities; heterogeneous workers; production technology; tournament;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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