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Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms

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  • Chrisman, James J.
  • Chua, Jess H.
  • Kellermanns, Franz W.
  • Chang, Erick P.C.

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  • Chrisman, James J. & Chua, Jess H. & Kellermanns, Franz W. & Chang, Erick P.C., 2007. "Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(10), pages 1030-1038, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:60:y:2007:i:10:p:1030-1038
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Lubatkin & William S. Schulze & N Dino Richard, 2003. "Exploring the agency consequences of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms," Post-Print hal-02311676, HAL.
    2. Shingo Ishiguro & Hideshi Itoh, 2001. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 1-20.
    3. Pramodita Sharma & S. Manikutty, 2005. "Strategic Divestments in Family Firms: Role of Family Structure and Community Culture," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 29(3), pages 293-311, May.
    4. Michael Lubatkin & William S. Schulze & Richard N. Dino, 2003. "Exploring the agency consequences of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms," Post-Print hal-02276698, HAL.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    6. Rodolphe Durand & Michael H. Lubatkin & Yan Ling, 2007. "The Missing Lens in Family Firm Governance Theory: A Self-Other Typology of Parental Altruism," Post-Print hal-00699185, HAL.
    7. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
    8. Jess H. Chua & James J. Chrisman & Pramodita Sharma, 1999. "Defining the Family Business by Behavior," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 23(4), pages 19-39, July.
    9. James J. Chrisman & Jess H. Chua & Pramodita Sharma, 2005. "Trends and Directions in the Development of a Strategic Management Theory of the Family Firm," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 29(5), pages 555-575, September.
    10. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
    11. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    12. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    13. Cadenillas, Abel & Cvitanic, Jaksa & Zapatero, Fernando, 2004. "Leverage decision and manager compensation with choice of effort and volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 71-92, July.
    14. Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, 1991. "Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 16(1), pages 49-64, June.
    15. Henry L. Tosi & Amy L. Brownlee & Paula Silva & Jeffrey P. Katz, 2003. "An Empirical Exploration of Decision‐making Under Agency Controls and Stewardship Structure," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 2053-2071, December.
    16. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    17. Lubatkin, Michael H. & Durand, Rodolphe & Ling, Yan, 2007. "The missing lens in family firm governance theory: A self-other typology of parental altruism," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(10), pages 1022-1029, October.
    18. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    19. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 511-528, June.
    20. Neri Karra & Paul Tracey & Nelson Phillips, 2006. "Altruism and Agency in the Family Firm: Exploring the Role of Family, Kinship, and Ethnicity," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 30(6), pages 861-877, November.
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