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Blockierte Politik: Ursachen und Folgen von "Divided Government" in Deutschland

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  • Burkhart, Simone

Abstract

Unterschiedliche parteipolitische Mehrheiten in Bundestag und Bundesrat gelten gemeinhin als Hauptursache für die Reformschwäche deutscher Politik. Simone Burkhart hinterfragt diese Annahme und kommt zu dem überraschenden Ergebnis, dass nicht das sogenannte "Divided Government" zu massiven Verzögerungen oder zum Scheitern von Reformen führt, sondern vielmehr die politische Selbstbeschränkung der Bundesregierung. Die mit viel Euphorie verabschiedete Föderalismusreform wird daher am Befund der "blockierten" Politik wohl kaum etwas ändern können.

Suggested Citation

  • Burkhart, Simone, 2008. "Blockierte Politik: Ursachen und Folgen von "Divided Government" in Deutschland," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 60, number 60.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgs:60
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm, 2009. "Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity," MPIfG Working Paper 09/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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