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Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections

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  • Mann, Thomas E.
  • Wolfinger, Raymond E.

Abstract

The 1978 CPS national election study, which includes many new questions about congressional candidates, is analyzed to discern what voters know about congressional candidates and why House incumbents are so successful at getting reelected by wide margins. Scholars have underestimated the level of public awareness of congressional candidates, primarily because of faulty measures. Voters are often able to recognize and evaluate individual candidates without being able to recall their names from memory. Incumbents are both better known and better liked than challengers, largely because they have the resources enabling them to communicate with their constituents frequently and directly. Yet the seriousness of the challenger is equally important for understanding the advantages of incumbency and why incumbency is less valuable in the Senate than in the House. Finally, public assessments of the president provide a national dynamic to congressional voting, but the effect is modest compared to the salience of the local choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Mann, Thomas E. & Wolfinger, Raymond E., 1980. "Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 617-632, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:74:y:1980:i:03:p:617-632_16
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    Cited by:

    1. Douglas Hart & Michael Munger, 1989. "Declining electoral competitiveness in the House of Representatives: The differential impact of improved transportation technology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 217-228, June.
    2. Larry Samuelson, 1984. "Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 307-327, January.
    3. Burkhart, Simone, 2008. "Blockierte Politik: Ursachen und Folgen von "Divided Government" in Deutschland," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 60, number 60.
    4. Jamie L. Carson & Gregory Koger & Matthew J. Lebo & Everett Young, 2010. "The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 598-616, July.
    5. Ebaid Ali & Bahari Zakaria, 2019. "The Nexus between Government Expenditure and Economic Growth: Evidence of the Wagner’s Law in Kuwait," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-9, April.
    6. Mitchell J. Lovett & Ron Shachar, 2011. "The Seeds of Negativity: Knowledge and Money," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(3), pages 430-446, 05-06.
    7. Burkhart, Simone, 2004. "Parteipolitikverflechtung: Der Einfluss der Bundespolitik auf Landtagswahlentscheidungen von 1976 bis 2002," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    8. Joseph Gershtenson, 2009. "Candidates and Competition: Variability in Ideological Voting in U.S. Senate Elections," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 90(1), pages 117-133, March.
    9. John Regan, 2012. "Ballot order effects : an analysis of Irish general elections," Working Papers 201216, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    10. Carrie Eaves, 2018. "Running in Someone Else’s Shoes: The Electoral Consequences of Running as an Appointed Senator," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 7(5), pages 1-12, May.
    11. Jamie L. Carson & Ryan D. Williamson, 2018. "Candidate ideology and electoral success in congressional elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 175-192, July.
    12. Michael Ensley & Scott Marchi & Michael Munger, 2007. "Candidate uncertainty, mental models, and complexity: Some experimental results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 231-246, July.
    13. Palguta, Ján & Pertold, Filip, 2021. "Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1020-1047.
    14. Royce Carroll & Henry A. Kim, 2010. "Party Government and the “Cohesive Power of Public Plunder”," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 34-44, January.
    15. Fiva, Jon H. & Røhr, Helene Lie, 2018. "Climbing the ranks: incumbency effects in party-list systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 142-156.

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