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What drives the diffusion of inclusionary zoning?

Author

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  • Rachel Meltzer

    (Assistant Professor, Urban Policy Analysis and Management, Milano The New School for Management & Urban Policy)

  • Jenny Schuetz

    (Assistant Professor, the School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California)

Abstract

Social scientists offer competing theories on what explains the policymaking process. These typically include economic rationalism, political competition or power struggles, and policy imitation of the kind that diffuses across spatially proximate neighbors. In this paper, we examine the factors that have influenced a recent local policy trend in California: inclusionary zoning (IZ). IZ programs require developers to make a certain percentage of the units within their market-rate residential developments affordable to low- or moderate-income households. By 2007, 68 percent of jurisdictions in the San Francisco Bay Area had adopted some type of IZ policy. We test the relative importance of economic, political, and spatial factors in explaining the rapid diffusion of IZ, across 100 cities and towns in the Bay Area. Consistent with an economic efficiency argument, results of hazard models provide some evidence that IZ is adopted in places with less affordable housing. However, political factors, such as partisan affiliation and the strength of affordable housing nonprofits, are even more robust predictors of whether or not a local government adopts IZ. There is no evidence of spatial diffusion in the case of IZ adoption; jurisdictions are not, on average, responding to the behavior of their neighbors. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Suggested Citation

  • Rachel Meltzer & Jenny Schuetz, 2010. "What drives the diffusion of inclusionary zoning?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(3), pages 578-602.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:29:y:2010:i:3:p:578-602
    DOI: 10.1002/pam.20510
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    Cited by:

    1. Walsh, Patrick J. & Bird, Stephen & Heintzelman, Martin D., 2015. "Understanding Local Regulation of Fracking: A Spatial Econometric Approach," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 138-163, August.
    2. Youness Achmani & Walter T. de Vries & José Serrano & Mathieu Bonnefond, 2020. "Determining Indicators Related to Land Management Interventions to Measure Spatial Inequalities in an Urban (Re)Development Process," Land, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-15, November.
    3. Jae Hong Kim & Jongho Won, 2024. "Exploring variations in local land use regulations in the U.S.: What matters and at what level?," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 73(3), pages 1071-1095, October.
    4. Diagne, Adji Fatou & Kurban, Haydar & Schmutz, Benoit, 2018. "Are inclusionary housing programs color-blind? The case of Montgomery County MPDU program," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 6-24.

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