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Externalities Aggregation In Network Games

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  • Francesco Feri
  • Paolo Pin

Abstract

We generalize the results on the monotonicity of equilibria for network games with incomplete information. We show that not only the distinction between strategic complements and strategic substitutes is important in determining the nature of the Bayesian Nash equilibria, but the nature of the statistic itself is also determinant. We show that understanding the underlying forces behind people's choices may be of fundamental importance for a policymaker that wants to incentivize efficient behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Feri & Paolo Pin, 2020. "Externalities Aggregation In Network Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1635-1658, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:61:y:2020:i:4:p:1635-1658
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12467
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. López-Pintado, Dunia & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Far above others," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
      • Dunia López-Pintado & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2018. "Far above others," Working Papers 18.12, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    2. Ruiz Palazuelos, Sofía, 2021. "Network Perception in Network Games," MPRA Paper 115212, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Jun 0022.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Panebianco, Fabrizio & Pin, Paolo, 2023. "Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

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