Economic effects of a mandated audit in a contingent†claims production economy
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1988.tb00671.x
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Philip R. Beaulieu, 1994. "Utilisation par les prêteurs commerciaux de l'information comptable en interaction avec la crédibilité de la source," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(2), pages 587-623, March.
- David R. Finley, 1994. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Discovery Sampling for Internal Fraud Control Auditing," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 91-114, June.
- Philip R. Beaulieu, 1994. "Commercial Lenders' Use of Accounting Information in Interaction with Source Credibility," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(2), pages 557-585, March.
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