IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpm/cepmap/9128.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Managerial incentives based on insider information

Author

Listed:
  • Caillaud Bernard
  • Jullien Bruno

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Caillaud Bernard & Jullien Bruno, 1991. "Managerial incentives based on insider information," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9128, CEPREMAP.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9128
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9128.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
    4. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    5. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    6. Antle, R, 1982. "The Auditor As An Economic Agent," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 503-527.
    7. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    8. John Christensen, 1981. "Communication in Agencies," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 661-674, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 1995. "Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 427-443, Fall.
    2. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
    3. Steven A. Matthews, 1991. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 950, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, 2007. "The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 698-713, September.
    5. Mark Penno, 1987. "A note on the value of information given asymmetric information and self†reporting," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(2), pages 368-374, March.
    6. Dionne, Georges & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(1), pages 47-80, mars-juin.
    7. Jia Xie, 2015. "Information, Risk Sharing and Incentives in Agency Problems," Staff Working Papers 15-7, Bank of Canada.
    8. Faynzilberg, Peter S. & Kumar, Praveen, 1997. "Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 15-39, October.
    9. Dirk Yandell, 1988. "Audit Information and Incentives for Efficiency," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 32(1), pages 49-58, March.
    10. Lee, Hangsuck & Lee, Minha & Hong, Jimin, 2022. "Optimal insurance under moral hazard in loss reduction," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    11. Arup Bose & Debashis Pal & David E. M. Sappington, 2011. "On the Performance of Linear Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 159-193, March.
    12. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, June.
    13. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    14. Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 19, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    15. Bartsch, Elga, 1996. "Enforcement of environmental liability in the case of uncertain causality and asymmetric information," Kiel Working Papers 755, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    16. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    17. Bala V. Balachandran & Lode Li & Robert P. Magee, 1987. "On the allocation of fixed and variable costs from service departments," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 164-185, September.
    18. Christopher Armstrong & David Larcker & Che-Lin Su, 2007. "Stock Options and Chief Executive Compensation," Discussion Papers 1447, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    19. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    20. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9128. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sébastien Villemot (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceprefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.