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The Impact of NuVal Shelf Nutrition Labels on Food Purchase

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  • Chen Zhen
  • Xiaoyong Zheng

Abstract

Summary shelf nutrition labels are one of a handful of practical strategies that hold the promise of improving nutrition and public health. We use a difference‐in‐differences approach to estimate the effect of the NuVal shelf label—an interpretive numeric score, now defunct, that rated the overall nutrition of foods from one (least healthful) to 100 (most healthful)—on consumer demand for yogurt. The results indicate that NuVal labels affected product sales through an information provision effect that increases with the value of the nutrition score on the product and a publicity (i.e., salience) effect that is unrelated to the level of the score. A one‐point increase in NuVal score on a yogurt product is estimated to increase demand by 0.23%.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen Zhen & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2020. "The Impact of NuVal Shelf Nutrition Labels on Food Purchase," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(4), pages 870-887, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:apecpp:v:42:y:2020:i:4:p:870-887
    DOI: 10.1093/aepp/ppz015
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    Cited by:

    1. Wenying Li & Eric Andrew Finkelstein & Chen Zhen, 2022. "Intended and unintended consequences of salient nutrition labels," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 104(2), pages 853-872, March.
    2. Henry Wolgast & McKenna M. Halverson & Nicole Kennedy & Isabel Gallard & Allison Karpyn, 2022. "Encouraging Healthier Food and Beverage Purchasing and Consumption: A Review of Interventions within Grocery Retail Settings," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(23), pages 1-17, December.

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