The Appointments Dilemma
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DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00078.x
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "The "Problem of Bureaucracy"," NBER Chapters, in: The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, pages 1-11, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Johnson, Ronald N. & Libecap, Gary D., 1994. "The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226401713, September.
- Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number john94-1.
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- Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 2012. "Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 83-95, July.
- Gary E Hollibaugh Jr, 2015. "Vacancies, vetting, and votes: A unified dynamic model of the appointments process," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 206-236, April.
- Charles M. Cameron & John M. de Figueiredo & David E. Lewis, 2016. "Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off," NBER Working Papers 22966, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Attig, Najah & Driss, Hamdi & El Ghoul, Sadok, 2021. "Credit ratings quality in uncertain times," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
- John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jinhee Jo & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2012. "Rational incompetence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(1), pages 3-18, January.
- Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 2008.
"Separation of powers and the budget process,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 407-425, April.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Separation of Powers and the Budget Process," NBER Working Papers 12332, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Helpman, Elhanan & Grossman, Gene M., 2006. "Separation of Powers and the Budget Process," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275696, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Separation of Powers and the Budget Process," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2119, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Helpman, Elhanan & Grossman, Gene, 2006. "Separation of Powers and the Budget Process," CEPR Discussion Papers 5745, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Sorge, 2015.
"Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 171-189, June.
- Marco M. Sorge, 2014. "Lobbying (Strategically Appointed) Bureaucrats," CSEF Working Papers 380, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Jinhee Jo & David M Primo & Yoji Sekiya, 2017. "Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 124-148, January.
- Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009.
"Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States,"
Discussion Papers
2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2011. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2011-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2011. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2011-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 95-135.
- Andonie, Costel, 2023. "Dismissal power," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
- Fang-Yi Chiou & Lawrence S Rothenberg, 2014. "Executive appointments: Duration, ideology, and hierarchy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(3), pages 496-517, July.
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