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The Life and Times of a Public-Sector Pension Plan Before Social Security: The US Navy Pension Plan in the Nineteenth Century

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  • Robert L. Clark
  • Lee A. Craig
  • Jack W. Wilson

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  • Robert L. Clark & Lee A. Craig & Jack W. Wilson, "undated". "The Life and Times of a Public-Sector Pension Plan Before Social Security: The US Navy Pension Plan in the Nineteenth Century," Pension Research Council Working Papers 99-10, Wharton School Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:pennpr:99-10
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    File URL: http://prc.wharton.upenn.edu/prc/insr/PRC/WP/99-10.PDF
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "The "Problem of Bureaucracy"," NBER Chapters, in: The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy, pages 1-11, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Frederick R. Macaulay, 1938. "Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States since 1856," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number maca38-1.
    3. Sylla, Richard & Wilson, Jack W., 1999. "Sinking funds as credible commitments: Two centuries of US national-debt experience," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 199-222, April.
    4. Roll, Richard, 1972. "Interest Rates and Price Expectations During the Civil War," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 476-498, June.
    5. Johnson, Ronald N. & Libecap, Gary D., 1994. "The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226401713, August.
    6. Sylla, Richard & Wallis, John Joseph, 1998. "The anatomy of sovereign debt crises: Lessons from the American state defaults of the 1840s," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 267-293, July.
    7. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    8. English, William B, 1996. "Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the 1840's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 259-275, March.
    9. Craig, Lee A., 1995. "The Political Economy of Public-Private Compensation Differentials: The Case of Federal Pensions," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 304-320, June.
    10. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number john94-1.
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