Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Missing Literature
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DOI: 10.1086/710158
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European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 1-19, August.
- Gilles Grolleau & Murat C Mungan & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2024. "Punishment Menus and their Deterrent Effects: An Exploratory Analysis," Post-Print hal-04670322, HAL.
- Friehe, Tim & Mungan, Murat C., 2022. "Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
- Jef De Mot & Murat C. Mungan, 2024. "Whistle‐blowing and the incentive to hire," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(3), pages 1292-1308, July.
- Monica C. Bell, 2021. "Next-Generation Policing Research: Three Propositions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 29-48, Fall.
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